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Abstract
We establish a set of US stylized facts on prices, quantities and balance
sheets, assess the consistency of the current generation of financial friction
(heterogeneous agent) models to these, and provide guidance on the chal-
lenges ahead. We find strong evidence for a deep transformation in the US
economy around the millenium shift, and argue that the difficulty in reviving
this growth model under current financial market conditions is behind the ane-
mic recovery since the Great Recession. A wider implication of our findings
is that accumulation of stocks might alter agents risk preferences, production
technologies, or beliefs to such a degree that the optimization problem that
those agents face has transformed over time. The economy is effectively in
a different state of nature, and agents may face different constraints. Future
models need to take a different strategy to modelling the long-run ratios, since
these have increased over the long-run and this has had an effect on both the
frequency and the amplitude of the business and credit cycles.
Keywords: Balance sheet, financial market, credit, secular stagnation, Great
Recession, business cycle, financial friction models
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1. Introduction
The nexus between real and financial activity has been the focus of the discussions
following the global financial meltdown in 2008. However, in contrast to previous
discussions, the key points raised were not solely related to the flow of funds between
the different sectors of the economy, but more importantly they were regarding
the endogenous effects of the growing pre-crisis balance sheets of each sector, in
particular the impact they had on intra- and inter-sector flows. Although that idea is
not entirely new or unique in the literature, the novelty has been that exact estimates
have been generated on how stocks, such as leverage and net worth of each sector
have impacted the expansion of real activity over the past one to two decades.2The
current generation of financial friction models has partially incorporated some of
these observations in their theoretical analyses of the macro-financial nexus. While
they represent a first attempt, they have already generated important insights into
how, for instance leverage in the financial sector influences the flow decisions of
each economic agent.3We wish to evaluate these models in the current paper in
terms of how well the models match the US macroeconomic and financial data,
and provide guidance and directions on how to proceed in this relatively new and
growing theoretical debate.
We do this by initially establishing a broad range of stylized facts regarding the
US macroeconomic and financial cycles. We ground our work on Stock and Wat-
son’s (1998) empirical study of the US business cycles, which provided the empirical
ground for the DSGE revolution over the past fifteen years.4They recorded a broad
set of stylized facts and empirical regularities between the aggregate business cycle
and macroeconomic indicators such as spending (including investment), produc-
tion, employment, productivity, wages, interest rates and prices using the post-war
dataset. However, the emphasis of the study was on real activity, and on sectorial
components of output, and much less on the financial side of the economy.
2The Austrian school had early on adopted a dynamic approach to the study of the economy,
which accommodated for stock accumulation and related imbalances in their analyses. See Laidler
(1999) for further discussion on the Austrian approach. For a recent discussion of these issues, see
for instance Adrian and Shin (2009), or Pozsar et al (2010).
3See for instance Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Hilberg and Hollmayr
(2011) on the real effects of financial sector leverage, or Chadha et al (2010) and Kiyotaki et al
(2011) on the real effects of household leverage, or Bernanke et al (1999), Gilchrist et al (2009),
and Christiano et al (2010) on the real effects of firm leverage.
4Chadha et al (2000), and Chadha and Nolan (2002) established similar stylized facts for the
UK.
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A few years later, by the turn of the millennium, considerable research effort had
made the case for a reduction in output volatility and other output-driven variables
during the preceding two decades.5Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2000), and Stock and Watson (2003) argued strongly, both in univariate
and multivariate break tests, that there had been a structural break in 1984. The
Great Moderation, as the period is referred to, exhibited distinctive characteris-
tics since most macroeconomic variables experienced a much smoother growth and
smaller cyclical fluctuations when compared to the overall pattern since the post-
war period. However, there was no agreement on the underlying causes for this new
episode. While some argued that this was a result of smarter policy making, in
particular monetary policy (Taylor (1999) and Cogley and Sargent (2001)), others
pointed towards smaller exogenous shocks (monetary, fiscal, commodity, produc-
tivity) hitting the US economy since mid-80’s. There was even a third category
who claimed that Great Moderation was a result of change in the structure of the
advanced economies, in particular the information-technology-led improvements in
inventory management (McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), and Kahn, McConnel,
and Perez-Quiros (2001, 2002)), and innovations in financial markets that facilitated
intertemporal consumption and investment smoothing (Blanchard and Simon, 2001).
Stock and Watson (2003) quantify the individual contributions and show that some
of the observed reduction can be attributed to more stable monetary policy, and to
less volatile productivity and commodity price shocks, but conclude that the ma-
jority of it is due to good luck in the form of smaller economic disturbances.6In
the present paper, we however argue that the Great Moderation was simply a tem-
porarely smooth period hiding deeper structural imbalances. Whereas standard
macroeconomic indicators indeed pointed towards a more stable economic phase,
a deeper analysis of balance sheets and flows of different sectors of the economy
reveal a much higher growth in size and volatility of the economy than previously
thought.7Therefore macroeconomic stability was possible only because financial in-
5See Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Simon (2000), Blanchard
and Simon (2001), Chauvet and Potter (2001), Sensier and van Dijk (2001), Ahmed, Levine and
Wilson (2002), Boivin and Giannone (2002a, 2002b), Sims and Zha (2002), and Stock and Watson
(2003), Primiceri (2005) amongst others. For a more detailed review of the literature, please refer
to Stock and Watson (2003).
6King (2006) denotes this as a NICE (non-inflationary consistent expansion) period since ex-
pansion was possible without causing inflation, even if the individual price-levels in the economy
fluctuated a lot. He attributes to firms and households’ increased flexibility in responding to sharp
movements in input costs, and a more disciplined (and clear) monetary policy as reasons behind
NICE.
7William R. White from BIS argued already in White (2005) that whereas inflation and output
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stabilities were being accumulated. As Stock and Watson (2003) finally conclude,
it was only a question of time before the economy turned back to more turbulent
cycles.
Parallel to these efforts, a number of other studies examined the relationship be-
tween business and financial cycles. Andreou et al (2000) found that the interest rate
term structure, and the volatilities of financial variables contain predictive informa-
tion for production growth as well as production volatility. Further, they uncover a
number of financial series that show substantial mean non-linearities depending on
the phases of the business cycle, which they interpret as an indicator of the necessity
to model the relationship between financial variables and industrial production in a
non-linear multivariate framework (which considers bidirectional effects of financial
variables on the business cycle).8Whereas they find close secular ties between the
business and financial cycles, another set of papers found more profound relations
between the two. Largely following the methodology proposed in Gourinchas et
al (1999), Mendoza and Terrones (2008) find that credit booms are associated with
periods of rising equity prices, real appreciation, and widening of the external deficit
in an upswing, followed by the opposite dynamics in a downswing. Moreover, firm
indicators (such as corporate leverage, firm value, and the use of external financing)
as well as bank-level indicators (such as credit issuance and asset returns) are all
procyclical, and reflect the central role that credit plays in both driving the sec-
tor and aggregate level cycles. They explain these facts by referring to the credit
transmission channel, where financial frictions in the financial industry lead to cy-
cles in lending, which in turn determine the business cycles via the various sectors
that comprise the economy (firms, households, banks). More recently, Claessens et
al (2011) took this idea further and investigated the degree of interplay between
business and financial cycles in 44 countries for the period 1960:I to 2007:IV. They
noted three facts. Business cycles often display a higher degree of synchronization
with credit and house price cycles than they do with equity prices. Second, re-
cessions (expansions) associated with financial disruptions tend to be longer and
deeper (with stronger output growth) than other recessions (expansions). Third,
had become less volatile, and periods of economic expansion considerably longer financial imbal-
ances, such as asset prices, credit, investment, and trade deficits were growing during the same
period, reflecting deeper imbalances. We take this further and do not only concentrate on firm
specific imbalances, but extend it to households, financial intermediaries, and the government in
our analysis.
8Examples of models that address these aspects are the Markov-switching models with ARCH
effects, or the time-varying transition probability models.
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duration and amplitude of recessions and recoveries are largely determined by the
strength and intensity of financial cycles. Recessions that are accompanied by house
price busts tend to become longer and substantially deeper than other recessions.
Further, recoveries coinciding with credit- and housing market booms are stronger,
whereas recoveries preceded by a housing market bust are often weaker.
Capitalizing on these insights, we wish to perform an in-depth analysis of the US
finance and macroeconomy and evaluate whether the current generation of macroe-
conomic models are consistent with these facts.9More specifically, we extend Stock
and Watson’s analysis in two dimensions. First, we establish some long-term regu-
larities and business cycle stylized facts in three parts. On the long end, we examine
the great ratios, money and prices, the interest rate term structure, as well as some
key household stock-flow ratios over the past 60 years. In the second part of the
empirical analysis, we also establish an extensive set of stylized facts on the US
business and financial cycles. Second, we examine the aggregate demand side as
well as the supply side, and determine the key supply-side factors explaining the
majority of fluctuations in US output. Third, we analyze the cyclical evolution of
stocks and flows of households, firms, financial intermediaries, and government, and
establish the changes that the different sectors of the economy have gone through
since the 1950’s. Next, in order to determine the degree of our understanding of
the macro-financial linkages in the US economy and the transmission channels be-
tween the two, we use the empirical facts established in the first part of the chapter
to validate the performance of the current generation of financial friction models
with the data. Not only in terms of the ability to replicate the data, but also in
terms of replicating the processes identified in the data. Finally, we provide a set of
mechanisms and paths that future models could embark on.
We find that the long-run relations (that many macroeconomic models assume to
be stationary in the long run) have persistently increased, in particular since financial
liberalization in the 1980’s. Specifically, the more than proportional rise in debt-to-
assets of households has since 1990’s lead to a rise in the consumption-output ratio
above its long-term mean. Financial engineering and the use of equity collateralized
debt as a general source of funding for households has meant that consumers have
been able to expand their spending without increasing the debt burden on their
budget constraint. Moreover over time, a larger share of household income has come
9The insights are that there exists a tight and deep relation between the financial and business
cycles, as well as the importance of understanding stocks and flows of various economic sectors in
order to understand the drivers of the aggregate cycle.
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from their equity holdings (rather than wages), with the (undesired) consequence
that consumption has become increasingly sensitive to shocks on wealth, via their
increased exposure to equity price fluctuations. Future financial friction models need
to capture the stylized facts of households in a more consistent and detailed way.
Equally, balance sheet of firms have become increasingly procyclical and volatile
since the 90’s which has lead to powerful financial contagion within the sector once
the price of assets decrease. While the FA mechanism captures the effects of asset
price movements on firm net worth and the credit supply, the stock prices in the
financial friction models are less volatile than the ones observed in the data. Future
models should produce more volatile asset prices and systematically study the effects
of market expectations on firms’ access to credit, default rate, investment levels, and
firm assets.
Turning to the public sector, a large share of the Federal debt is now owned by
foreign investors. At the same time, the foreign bond holding series have turned
procyclical during the past decade. An interesting exercise would be to examine
how large negative international shocks (either of the exchange rate, or in the foreign
economy) affect the US government inflows, the capacity to issue new bonds, and the
ability to run its spending policies. For policy makers, it might be of high interest
to find the optimal level/percentage of foreign ownership of the debt at which on
one hand, the debt portfolio is diversified, but on the other the future government
budget constraint is not put in danger by over-exposure to international shocks.
There are a few other points which we identified in the empirical analysis, but
which the models to some extent ignore. The volatility of US output has over the
past 60 years shifted between episodes of high and low volatility. We observed a
similar pattern in many macroeconomic aggregates. Similarly for financial spreads
we noted that the preference for long-term over short-term debt changes over the
business cycle. While long-term debt is attractive during economic upturns because
of the low costs of borrowing, the short-term one becomes attractive in downturns
since the spreads are less volatile (offering a more secure source of funding) and
certain segments of the short-term credit market offer low borrowing costs. Since
agents face this trade-off between different debt maturities, frictions in one segment
of the financial market do not necessarily always cause contractions in the real sector
since firms/households (or even banks) can substitute one for the other and avoid
being short of funding. One way to capture this might be to include a Markov-
switching process where the economy switches between a high and low volatility
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regime, and explore the model dynamics under the two regimes as well as examine
the probability distribution of switching between the regimes.
To conclude, financial engineering and optimism lead to very rapid accumulation
of stocks (e.g. debt, equity), which resulted in secular increases in the long-term
ratios. Macroeconomic models assume that these ratios are stationary in the steady
state, but the long-run analysis showed that these can persistently deviate from their
long-run mean. The result can be an inaccurate representation and modeling of the
business cycles. Future models should allow these ratios to vary over the long-run,
and study their effects on the evolution of business cycles.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin our analysis in Section
1.2 by outlining the theoretical framework we will use to analyze our balance sheet
data, as well as describing the data. In Section 1.3, we examine a selection of ratios
that hold over a longer time horizon. We continue by updating Stock and Watson’s
(1998) macroeconomic dataset and describing the patterns over the US business
cycle in the first part of Section 1.4, while in the second part, we perform the
same analysis for two completely new data categories: Balance sheets and financial
spreads. We decompose output growth into supply side factors in Section 1.5. In
Section 1.6, we contrast the current generation of DSGE financial friction models
to our US data and outline their merits as well as challenges ahead. Section 1.7
concludes.
2. Stocks and flows in the US economy
Our aim in this empirical section is to establish a stock flow consistent macroeco-
nomic portrait of the US economy. More specifically, we wish to depict the economy
using data from the Flow of Funds accounts, which jointly report the financial and
physical stocks of the various sectors as well as the transactions carried out between
the sectors. We follow a similar approach to Benito et al (2001) at Bank of Eng-
land, White (2005) at BIS and the European Economic and Financial Affairs (2010)
of the European Commission in analysing the endogenous effects of balance sheet
stocks on financial and non-financial flows. They find that the change in the com-
position of the private sector (households and firms) balance sheet coupled with a
heavy surge in private indebtedness has had important effects on private agent flow
decisions and economic growth in general. In particular, they find that the result
has been an increase in private sector imbalances, which unfold when a negative
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shock hits the financial system or the economy, and create prolonged contractions.
Households and firms are forced to adjust their balance sheets for a significant time
period, which does not only lead to a reduction in flows (consumption, investment,
production, savings) within the sector, but result in negative inter-sectoral spill-over
effects since the balance sheets of the two agents are closely linked. So for instance,
the European Commission (2010) finds that a corporate balance sheet adjustment
always leads to a reduction in wage costs, which causes a fall in disposable personal
income of households, and thus a reduction in demand and consumption. Similarly,
Benito et al (2001) finds that there is an inverse relationship between the debt bur-
den of firms and households. If companies decide to reduce their debt burden more
rapidely (typical for recessions), this would mean that households would have less
income and thus higher debt burden. But in recessions, households are also forced
to reduce their debt burden. And if they were struggling to reduce it before the re-
cession, they will be struggling even more now that their disposable income has been
reduced as a result of the rapid de-leveraging in the corporate sector.10Nevertheless,
the studies mentioned above only look at the developments during the past 10 to
15 years. Here instead we wish to take a much longer stance and describe sectoral
patterns in terms of stocks and flows since the post-war period, as well as include
all sectors of the economy in order to get a holistic view of the US macro-financial
evolution.
Before we go on to examine the data, let us first outline the data, and describe
the stocks and flows we consider in this analysis.
2.1. Data
Following Stock and Watson (1998), we consider 1953:I to be a good starting point
for our long term view on the US Business cycle, and in all include 237 quarterly
observations per variable from 1953:1 to 2011:II.11We use a broad range of season-
ally adjusted (when applicable) macroeconomic and financial variables in order to
represent all aspects of the US economy. We group them into seven categories:
(1) Macroeconomic variables, (2) Monetary aggregates, (3) Firm sector data, (4)
Household sector data, (5) Balance sheets of financial intermediaries, (6) Federal
10The Austrian puts at the center of their analysis the financial imbalances caused by high stock
accumulation as the reason to why the adjustment from one equilibrium to another is not smooth,
i.e. why we have periodic crises.
11There are a few exceptions constrained on the data availability. Please refer to Appendix A
for a list of variables and their starting dates.
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government data, (7) Balances with the rest of the world, and (8) Financial prices.
To be more specific, we have included the following variables in each category:
1. Macroeconomic variables: Real GDP, Real personal consumption expen-
diture on nondurable goods, Real private domestic investment, Real capital
stock at 2000 prices, Inventory assets of non-farm non-financial firms, Hours of
work of all persons employed in non-farm business sector, Total weekly hours
of production in the manufacturing sector, Output per hour of all persons, Im-
plicit GDP deflator, Urban consumer price index, Producer price index of all
commodities, Net exports of goods and services, Balance on current accounts,
Real narrow average exchange rate, and Real effective exchange rate index.
2. Monetary aggregates: Adjusted monetary base, M1, M2-M1, Velocity of
M1, and Velocity of M2.
3. Firm data: Firm assets, Firm liabilities, Firm net worth at market value,
Corporate profits, Net acquisition of financial assets, Equity prices, Real com-
pensation per hour, Total level of loans to firms, and Debt of corporate sector.
4. Household data::Household assets, Household liabilities, Household net worth,
Real disposable personal income, Net worth/real disposable personal income,
Private residential fixed investment, Deposits of households, Gains on corpo-
rate equities, Home mortgages, Commercial mortgages of households, Con-
sumer credit, Consumer credit given by firms, and Total debt of household
sector.
5. Balance sheet of financial sector: Bank assets, Non-bank financial insti-
tution assets, Bank liabilities, Non-bank financial institution liabilities, Debt
of financial sector.
6. Government data: Federal current expenditures, Federal non-defense invest-
ment, Federal defense investment, Federal government current net receipts,
Net federal government savings, and Debt of the federal government.
7. External sector: Federal debt owned by foreigners, FDI in US, US FDI
abroad
8. Financial prices: Federal funds rate, 3-month T-bill rate, 10-year T-bond
rate, Moody’s long-term AAA bond rate, Moody’s long-term BAA bond rate,
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30 year Government bond rate, 3-month LIBOR rate, 3-month Prime rate,
3-month Eurodollar deposit rate, 3-month (certificate of) deposit rate, and
3-month commercial paper rate.
In the first category, we have included the standard measures of spending, in-
vestment, capital, production, prices, and trade. In the second category, we have in-
cluded standard measures of both money supply and money demand. Most macroe-
conomic indicators are expressed in real terms. The subsequent four categories cover
some key flow and stock variables for the various sectors such as total assets, total lia-
bilities, net worth, debt, and measures of inflow/income, and outflow/spending.12We
have also included the most important US balances with the rest of the world. For
the final category, we have both included standard benchmark (government) rates,
as well as the most important lending and deposit rates. We will then construct a
set of financial spreads that capture the cost of lending/borrowing for firms, banks,
and households. Ultimately, we would like to understand how the cost of lend-
ing/borrowing over the cycle affects the balance sheets of the various sectors.
Where relevant, the variables have been seasonally adjusted. For financial rates
and equity data, which are available in much higher frequency (daily), we have used
the end-of-quarter observation. Despite its drawbacks, we consider this to be a
superior method than using the sample average for the quarterly frequency since it
creates the problem of undesirable smoothing. A more detailed outline of the data
can be found in Annex A.
For the recession and expansion dates, we use the National Bureau of Economic
Research official dates on US business cycle peaks and troughs. The dates are
reported in Table I.1 and the recession dates are marked by the vertical gray lines
in the graphs.
Further, we split the analysis in two dimensions. The first dimension is aggregate
demand versus aggregate supply. The first two sections aim to identify the most
important aggregate demand components of the US economy, while in the third, we
determine the key supply-side factors for explaining the fluctuations in US output.
12We understand that more variables could be included for a more detailed investigation, but n
order to restrict the size and maintain a focus in the analysis, we restrict ourselves to a number of
aggregate balance sheet variables. Moreover, for some financial variables, such as mortgage lending
rates and portion of federal debt held by foreigners, the data starts much later, which reduces the
possibility to take a long-stance view on those measures, and therefore we have used close proxies
for those.
10
The second dimension splits long-term versus short- and medium term aspects of
the economy. While in the first section, we are interested in understanding the long-
term drifts by looking at trends of the great ratios, money, prices, term structure,
and household balance sheet, in the subsequent section, we are concerned with the
cyclical properties of the macro-financial nexus over a long period of time.
2.2. Stocks
We introduce a simple framework to analyze the evolution of balance sheets since the
post-war period. In particular, we consider balance sheets of five sectors: households,
firms, banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, and the Federal Government. We
follow the definitions used in the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. Let
us outline the balance sheets of the different sectors, and their respective definitions
(and identities):
Households
Assets Liabilities
Nonfinancial assets Total Household debt
Financial assets Net worth
Table 1: Household balance sheet
Firms
Assets Liabilities
Nonfinancial assets Total Corporate debt
Financial assets Net worth
Table 2: Firm balance sheet
A = NFA + FA, where NFA (2 in B.100 for households and 2 in B.102 for
firms in Flow of Funds Accounts) are non-financial assets and FA (8 in B.100 for
households and 6 in B.102 for firms) are financial assets. In our business cycle
analysis, we have simply included data on total assets. However, for households, we
have also included data on two specific sub-categories of financial assets, deposits
(9 in B.100) and corporate equities (24 in B.100). For firms, we have in addition
included the data on inventories (5 in B.102), a sub-category of the non-financial
asset data. This variable is a good proxy for how well firm sales are evolving over
the cycle.
On the liability side, we have that: L ≡ D+NW , where L represents liabilities,
D total debt (31 in B.100 for households and 21 in B.102 for firms) and NW is net
worth (42 in B.100 for households and 32 in B.102 for firms). We have included
data on total debt both for the household and the corporate sectors. Due to the
restrictions of the accounting principles of the US Financial Accounts, debt securities
are recorded at book value rather than market value. Moreover, for the household
sector we have decomposed the debt series, and report detailed data on three types
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of debt: mortgages (33 in B.100), consumer credit (34 in B.100), and household
commercial mortgages (38 in B.100). Finally, net worth is defined as:
NW = A − L, where A are total assets, and L total liabilities. Net worth of
firms is recorded at market value.
Financial interm. [Banks & Non-Banks]
Assets Liabilities
Reserves Checkable deposits (Banks)
Securities Time and Saving deposits (Banks)
Loans Borrowings
Physical Assets Bank Capital
Table 3: Balance sheet of financial in-
termediaries
Government
Assets Liabilities
Loans receivable and securities Federal pension and benefit liabilities
Property Total Gross Debt
Table 4: Government balance sheet
For financial intermediaries, we have only included data on total assets and total
liabilities. However we have split them into banks and non-bank financial interme-
diaries. For the Federal government, we are mostly interested in the sustainability
of government finances, and have therefore only included explicit series on Total
debt (5 in L.105). Nevertheless, we have also included a measure of government
deficit/surplus called Government savings which will also capture the balancing of
the Federal budget (and thus the budget sustainability) in each period. Finally,
we also wish to depict the international side of the US economy by depicting the
accounts with the rest of the world:
Rest of the world
Assets Liabilities
Total Federal debt held by foreigners Foreign bonds held by US
FDI in US US FDI abroad
Table 5: Rest of the world balance
sheet
In particular, we are interested in analysing the US Total Federal debt held by
foreigners (8 in L.106) as well as FDI in US (24 in L.106). On the liability side,
we have two datasets on the US FDI abroad, one on the financial businesses and
another on the non-financial corporate businesses, that we have merged into one to
get a total US FDI abroad (39 and 42 in L.106). For foreign bonds held by US, the
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share is much lower compared to US bonds held by foreigners, and since we do not
have good data on that series, we have not included that in our analysis. We did
not find good quality data on the US net external position that goes sufficiently far
back in time, and can therefore only comment on the main gross components.
We perform the balance sheet analysis in two levels. The first level is equal for
all agents where we compare the evolution of total assets versus total liabilities. For
the second level, however, the differences between agents are bigger, since we wish
to understand the sources of total assets and liabilities that are specific for each
agent. In the case of households, we specifically look at the sources of financial
assets by dividing the category into two: equity savings, and deposits. Similarly,
on the liability side we assess three sources of debt: mortgages, commercial debt,
and other types of debt. For firms, we are interested in studying inventories, and
examine how changes in asset prices have influenced the value of inventories, as
well as debt. Hence, we wish to assess the impact of quantity changes, as well
as price differentials over time on the size and value of corporate balance sheets.
With respect to the financial industry, we separately examine the evolution of total
assets and liabilities of banks versus non-bank financial intermediaries. Lastly, for
government, we are specifically interested in the evolution of government savings,
and its impact on total public debt.13
2.3. Flows
We wish to complement the stocks with some important information on flows in
each period. In particular, we wish to understand how intra-period transactions
have changed over time by making use of a set of key accounting identities for each
sector. Our emphasis is thus on net transactions.
Transactions are recorded as net purchases or sales at the current market price,
which means that exchanges within one sector cancel out each other and do not show
up in the accounts. On the other hand, exchanges between sectors are recorded as
a negative value for the sector selling the product and a positive value for the sector
purchasing it.14
We will mainly consider income and expenditure decisions of the non-financial
13Note that stocks are recorded as net purchases over time. However, for some instruments,
such as equities and other related ones, value outstanding reflects both the accumulation of net
purchases and any change in value caused by an increase or decrease in prices. See Flow of Funds
description in Teplin, 2001.
14Flow of Funds description, see Teplin, 2001.
13
sectors in our analysis. Hence, our focus will be on income flows, consumption and
investment, borrowing and saving of households, firms, and the government. For
households, it is useful to think of the flows as:
Ct = PDYt + ∆B
h
t − St (1)
PDYt ≡ Wt +RstSt−1 (2)
∆Bht ≡ Bht − (1 +Rbt)Bht−1 (3)
where PDYt is the personal disposable income of a household, Ct, St, B
h
t , Wt
denote consumption, savings, net borrowing, and wages at time ’t’, Rst is the interest
at ’t’ a household receives on net savings from ’t-1’, and Rbt is the interest paid on
household borrowings. The household borrowing rate will be above the policy rate
since it includes the default costs and profit margin that lenders wish to make on
their lending. In our analysis, we have included two series on household savings,
as well as three series on household loans. On the savings side, we have included
traditional deposits, as well as savings in corporate equities. On borrowing, we have
information on household mortgages, consumer credit, as well as consumer credit
given by firms. While we expect the first series to be the largest share of total
household borrowings, we wish to understand if the other two series have increased
in importance.
Likewise, for firms we can think of flows as:
∆Qt∆Kt = ∆Dt − ct (4)
∆Dt ≡ Dt − (1 +Rdt )Dt−1 (5)
with the first equation expressing that the change in inventories ∆Qt∆Kt is
financed with net debt/equity issuance, ∆Dt, which includes the interest rate pay-
ment that firms have to pay lenders for liquidity they received in the previous period
(subsequent equation). The interest rate on debt Rdt will be above the policy rate,
since it includes the default costs and profit margin that lenders wish to make on
their lending. ct are costs related to production, such as wages, taxes, etc. Finally,
government flows can be expressed as:
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Gct +G
ndi
t +G
di
t = TRt + ∆Bt (6)
∆Bt ≡ Bt −RbtBt−1 (7)
where the expenditure side is a sum of Gct government consumption, G
ndi
t govern-
ment non-defense investment, and Gdit government defense investment. The income
side includes TRt net government receipts (net of transfers), and Bt net bond is-
suance. Net bond issuance, or bonds outstanding, is the difference between bonds
at time ’t’ and the debt repaid in ’t-1’ (subsequent equation).15
3. Selected long-run relations in the US economy
Let us start by looking at relations of some standard macroeconomic variables that
we expect to hold only over a longer horizon. More precisely, we would like to follow
the approach used in Stock and Watson (1998) and Klein and Kosobud (1961) to
analyze three such empirical relations: Long-run money demand, the term structure
of interest rates, and three great ratios: capital-output, investment-output, and
consumption-output. In addition, we wish to enlarge the pool of variables and look
at various price indices, and household balance sheet (assets and liabilities). We
intrinsically assume that the original data series are more persistent than the linear
combinations of those.16
For the price indices, we use data on the urban CPI, PPI of all commodities, and
the implicit GDP deflator. Their base year has been standardized to 1983 for all
price indices. For the term structure, we use the spread between a 10-year T-bond
(long) and the 3-month T-bill rate (short). For the great ratios, we use data on
consumption expenditure on non-durable goods, capital stock, and real investment.
Consumption expenditure and real investment are expressed in terms of the 2009
prices, while capital stock is expressed in terms of the 2005 prices. Lastly, for the
data on household we use the velocity of narrow money (M1) as a proxy for the
demand of money by households.17
Most variables begin in 1953:I, with the exception of household sector debt
15Note that for financial instruments, we separate the quantity changes over time from price
changes at which they will be (re-)paid
16Future work should expand to include five (instead of three) great ratios of Klein and Kosobud
(1961).
17Since household mainly demand narrow money for their expenditures.
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(1953:III), 3-month T-bill and 10-year T-bond rates (1957:II), and velocity of M1
(1959:I). With the exception of the variables expressed in ratios, all variables were
logged. The variables are depicted in Figure III.1.
3.1. The great ratios
Our series are all expressed in real terms, chained to 2005 prices. We could equally
have expressed the series in current prices, and deflated them with any price in-
dex. However, since we are interested in the relationship between consumption,
investment, and capital, changing it uniformly the deflator would not alter this in-
trinsic relationship. If we, on the other hand, apply the CPIU to consumption, and
PPI to investment and capital stock, then we would observe three things. For the
pre-1984 period, the indices are almost identical so there would not observe any
differences in real terms. Then, following 1984 and up to 2001, the CPIU grew at
a much higher rate, which means that the consumption/output ratio would, ceteris
paribus, be at a lower level and grow by less compared to either investment or cap-
ital stock. However, from 2002, the PPI grew at a faster rate (even if it remained
below CPIU), resulting in the reverse picture with investment/output and capital
stock/output experiencing, ceteris paribus, a slower growth, even if in level terms
the consumption/output is deflated by more.
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991) have
argued that the great ratios should be stationary over the longer run, albeit the indi-
vidual variables contain trends. While investment-output ratio is largely stationary
in our dataset, capital-output and consumption-output ratios have persistently in-
creased.18Taking into account that capital is a stock measure while investment and
consumption are flows, we note that the strongest growth since the post-war period
has been in aggregate consumption. Whereas in the 1960’s, the ratio was around
52 percent, it was as high as 64 percent by 2007 with the sharpest rise concen-
trated to the period after the financial liberalization and Volcker’s monetary policy
in the early 1980’s. Had we used the CPIU for consumption and PPI for investment
instead, the only difference would have been that the rise in consumption/output
would have been visible only following 2001 and not as early as 1980’s. Thus the
first stylized fact relevant for DSGE models is therefore that consumption-output
does not have a steady state ratio and consumption does not return to that level
18We do not observe a trend in the investment-output series in Figure III.1. However, we do
not perform a formal test of stationarity in these exercises.
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following a shock, but rises over time.
3.2. Term structure of interest rates
We are equally interested in examining the fluctuations in levels, the spreads be-
tween the 10-year T-bond and the 3-month T-bill rates. In levels, we observe high
fluctuations of both rates over time, but note that both the short-term and the long-
term government borrowing has been the cheapest in over 40 years during the past
decade. The two rates fell to a record low of 4 percent (or below) at the onset of the
latest boom in 2002.19Hence the opportunity cost of issuing government bonds was
low during the past decade, and the level of debt on government balance sheets was
sustainable (since the costs of repayment were stable and low). Moreover, since the
market rates for various financial products are benchmarked to the policy rate, and
this hit a record low during the latest boom, credit was, in relative historic terms,
equally cheap over this period. We will discuss this point further when we analyze
the business cycle pattern of financial rates and spreads below.
However, a closer look at the term spread reveals a deeper complexity. While the
spread seems to fluctuate around a fixed mean, the mean has increased from some-
where between 0 and 50 basis points (1957-1982) to between 100 and 150 basis points
(2000-2011). This means that, on average, the short-term external financing has be-
come cheaper since 1980’s turning it into a more attractive form of financing for
the government. In addition, this preference for short-term liquidity was enhanced
during the 2001-2006 period, since the term spread reached almost 4 percent.
A desirable financial friction model should incorporate two facts from the term
structure analysis. The first one is that the sustainability of government finances
will depend on the future borrowing costs on the sovereign bond market. Since
the government faces a trade-off between raising taxes and issuing bonds in order to
finance its spending/investment plans, and taxes bear a social cost since they distort
private consumption and investment, there is an incentive to issue bonds. As we
have seen, the low borrowing costs, in particular the short-term one, since 2000 has
meant that the incentive for issuing bonds, instead of raising taxes has been very
high.
The second stylized fact is that models which include a term structure of the
interest rate should model the spread broadly-speaking as a mean-reverting process.
19With 1957-67 as the only other period when the rates were equally low.
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3.3. Money and prices
To give a broader picture on price developments, we have included three distinct
price indices: GDP deflator, Consumer price index and Producer price index.20The
three series are very persistent and cointegrated, meaning that the relative prices
are stationary. However, the margin between PPI and CPIU has increased since
1980’s (and in particular during 1990’s), reflecting the decreasing profit margins of
firms. Following Caporale et al (2002) we interpret this as firms facing difficulties
in passing on their higher costs (as represented by the level of the PPI index) onto
consumers, decreasing thus their margins.
Turning to money, the quantity theory of money (and monetarists) consider (in
the absence of inflationary or deflationary expectations) the long-run velocity to be
constant. Using the standard definition of velocity:
V =
PtYt
M st
(8)
where Pt is the price level, Yt nominal output, and M
s
t is the money supply
at time ’t’. Velocity is therefore equivalent to the amount of economic activity
associated with a given money supply. Our graph in Figure III.1 shows instead
that velocity of money has constantly increased since the 1960’s, with the sharpest
rise between mid-90’s and 2008. Since money supply was maintained high during
the past two decades (because of the low policy rate), the ‘spending effect’ on the
part of consumers was very high and the speed at which money changed hands
outperformed the rise in money supply, resulting in a higher increase in output,
and therefore an overall rise in the above ratio during this period. Teplin (2001)
argues that the high ’spending effect’ is a result of a much higher indebtedness of
households, since wages did not significantly rise during this period. Let us examine
this argument a little closer in the next subsection.
3.4. Household balance sheet
Indeed the rise in household debt is very visible from Figure III.1. In 1953 the ratio
between assets/GDP to debt/GDP was 1.72, but by 2008, the ratio had shrank to
only 1.19. Hence, not only did the rise in debt outperform the rise in GDP, growing
almost twice as fast as the GDP, but also the rate at which households were taking
20All three price indices are indexed to 1983 price levels, i.e. 1983=100.
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on debt was much higher than the rise in the value of their assets. For financial
friction models, this means that there may not be a single steady state value for the
household debt-to-asset ratio, but rather that the ratio is itself endogenous. The
models need to incorporate mechanisms, such as financial innovation, collateralized
housing debt, and/or subjective beliefs (more on this in section 1.4) that would allow
households to accumulate debt at a faster pace and above the rate of growth of assets.
Omitting this fact in a macroeconomic model might lead to an underestimation of
risks, the level of imbalances, and the probability of a crisis.
3.5. What more can financial friction models take away from these facts?
The steady increase in many long-run relations (consumption to output, household
debt-to-assets, or velocity of M1) found in the data reveals a deeper shortcoming
of current macroeconomic models. Namely many of them assume that those ratios
are constant in the steady state, and can therefore not be permanently altered.
Our data shows that most of them have increased over the long-run as well as the
short-run. One alternative to correct for this is to calculate different steady state
ratios for these variables depending on the sample period considered and optimize
based on the new ratios, or possibly include state-contingent optimizations which
means that the variables can converge to multiple steady states depending on the
shock (or state of nature) they find themselves in.21A more refined but technically
cumbersome approach might be to abolish steady state ratios for these variables and
endogenize the accumulation of stocks so that the optimization problem of agents
changes with the (debt) stocks accumulated by them, by for instance altering their
risk preferences, technologies, or conditional forecasts. Mian et al, 2012 reach a
similar conclusion in their empirical study of the nexus between household balance
sheets, consumption, and economic recession using a novel dataset on county-level
retail sales.
4. Historical business cycle properties of major economic time series
To set the scene, we begin by recording some of the macro-financial regularities with
which any macroeconomic model should be consistent. The business cycle turning
points as identified by NBER and listed in Table 1, constitute a broadly accepted
21In Godley (1999, 2004) the model variables converge to a new steady state following a (tem-
porary) shock.
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business cycle chronology.22
The business cycle frequency of the data is isolated using standard linear filtering
methods within the classical business cycle theory. The periodicity of the business
cycle is assumed to be between six quarters and eight years.23While some authors
have used nonlinear filters to study business cycles, modern studies of business
cycle properties use linear filters since the underlying theory is better understood.
Therefore, to facilitate the comparison with previous work in the literature, we use
the same method.
Following standard practices we have calculated the correlation and the rela-
tive standard deviation of each variable to output for the entire sample period as
well as decade-by-decade in Tables I.3 to I.7. The decade-by-decade split of the
summary statistics should be seen as a compliment to the graphs and the overall
sample moments, and not as exclusive. One could also split the sample in alter-
native ways, such as per business cycle, per monetary regime/chairmanship, or per
financial regulatory structure, but the subsamples would be very heterogeneous in
size, and therefore we preferred using the method by Stock and Watson (2003) that
produces homogeneous subsamples.24The corresponding graphs for the filtered series
are reported in Appendix III.
We have divided our analysis in two sections. The first one updates Stock and
Watson’s (1998) analysis on quantities and prices by looking at macroeconomic
and monetary aggregates. The second one, however, is entirely new and considers
balance sheet variables of the major economic agents, the balance sheet with the
external sector, as well as financial data on money and credit as represented by
financial rates and spreads.
But, before we go on to examine the data, let us first briefly outline the filtering
approach used in the current paper.
22See Stock and Watson (1998) for further details on how the business cycle turningpoints are
determined at the NBER.
23Hence the high frequency fluctuations (associated with measurement errors or seasonality) and
the low frequency fluctuations (associated with trend growth) are eliminated. The ideal filter would
need an infinite number of observations to be implemented. However, a feasible finite filter is used
to approximate this ideal filter. Those proxies are the first-difference filter, the Hodrick-Prescott
filter, and the Bandpass filter. Their outputs will be compared in the subsequent subsection.
24The first (and last) decade include less (more) quarterly data points than the others, but they
contain too few (many) observations in order to be included (separated) in the next category.
20
4.1. Filters
All data were logged before they were filtered, with the exception of financial rates
and spreads. We employ the widely used Hodrick-Prescott (1981, 1997) filter in
order to decompose the time series into a trend (τt) and cyclical (ζt) component by
solving a least square problem. We are able to isolate the cyclical component by the
following minimization problem:25
min
τt
T∑
t=1
ζ2t + λ
T∑
t=3
[(1−B)2τt]2 (9)
where τt is the trend component of the data, ζt is the cyclical component, λ is the
smoothing parameter, and B is the standard lag operator, or inverse of the forward
operator, such that Bjxt = xt−j. The first term B is a measure of the fitness of the
time series while the second λ is a measure of smoothness. Since there is an intrinsic
conflict between the two measures (goodness of fit vs smoothness), we control it by
calibrating the trade-off parameter, λ to some specific value, where λ = 0 implies
that the trend component is equal to the original series, whereas λ =∞ means that
the trend component is a linear trend. In other words, λ penalizes the variability
in the trend component, with an inverse relationship between the magnitude of the
parameter and the volatility of the trend (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).
This more general representation of the initial Hodrick and Prescott (1981) ad
hoc definition can be seen as a special case of the Butterworth family of filters
(Gomez (1999)), or as a Wiener-Kolmogorov filter (Kaiser and Maravall (2001))
commonly used in signal processing. Moreover, the HP-filter does not amplify the
high frequency noise while de-trending, a clear improvement from other linear trend
filters (Stock and Watson (1998)). Nonetheless, it holds a few limitations. First, in
order for the filter to be optimal, the data must a priori be known to have an I(2)
trend. Therefore, one-time permanent shocks to the level of trend or a fixed (split)
trend growth rate, the H-P filter distorts the cyclical properties and the higher
moments of the data in a significant way.26Second, the cycle component must be
a white noise, or the dynamic mechanism must propagate identical changes in the
trend growth rate and the innovations to the business cycle component in order for
25We set the smoothing parameter λ equal to 1600 since we deal with quarterly frequency. See
Hodrick and Prescott (1982, 1997), Ravn and Uhlig (2002), and Marcet and Ravn (2004) for a
discussion on the value of the smoothing/penalty parameter.
26King and Rebello (1993), Cogley and Nason (1995).
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the H-P filter to be optimal (French, 2001). The effect is that at low frequencies (i.e.
data series that do not have peaks at business cycle frequencies), the filter provides
a distorted business cycle, but Baxter and King (1999) show that this is also true
for the standard bandpass filter (Guay and Amant (2005)). Moreover, Baxter and
King (1999) point out that the H-P filter with λ = 1600 works equally well as the
bandpass filter with a cutoff at 16 or 32 quarters.27
To compare the statistical properties of different filters within our sample, we
have isolated the business cycle frequency in the series using three types of filters:
the first-difference, the bandpass and the H-P filters. The first-differencing filter
succeeds in eliminating the trend component, but it attenuates the effects of high
frequency noise. As a result, the cycles are very short and volatile. Compared to the
previous, in the case of the bandpass filter, the fluctuations of the series are more
closely centered around a zero mean. Also, the high frequency variation, which is
highly visible in the case of the first-difference filter, has been eliminated. Lastly, the
cycles in the H-P filter are very similar (if not nearly identical) to the bandpass filter.
The largest recession of 1973-75, early 1980’s, and 2008-10, as well as the smaller
ones of 1969-70, 1990-91, and 2001-02 are identically captured by both filters. The
only visible difference is that cycles of some variables are slightly smoother when
bandpass filter is applied, which means that the very high-frequency noise outside
the business cycle frequency band is more effectively eliminated. To sum up, both
filters produce very similar output, and thus can be equally applied.
Since our ultimate objective in this paper is to contrast the US stylized facts to
the outputs produced by financial friction models, which are mostly based on H-P
filters, to economize on space and for the sake of focus, in the subsequent sections
we will not provide a comprehensive discussion of the sensitivity of our results to
different filter choices. Stock and Watson (1998) do provide a discussion, but as in
our case do not find any significant deviations between the two filters.
4.2. Business cycle quantities and prices
4.2.1. Real activity
At a general level, we observe regime swings in the volatility of the business cycle,
switching between periods with higher and lower volatilities. While during the
27See Harvey and Jaeger (1993), Cogley and Nason (1995) and Canova (1997), amongst others
for further discussions on the limitations of the H-P filter.
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Golden Age (1950-71) period and the Great Moderation (1984-2008) the volatility
was (in absolute and relative terms) low, it was significantly higher during 1970’s
(following the collapse of Bretton Woods (1971) and the two oil shocks in 1974
and 1979), and since 2008 (the Great Recession).28This business cycle evolution
is comparable to a Markov-switching mechanism whereby the economy switches
between high-volatility and low-volatility regimes.29
Similar to Stock and Watson (1998), we find that consumption, investment, asset
prices and productivity are all procyclical. With 1970’s as the only exception (when
consumption lagged GDP), consumption has tightly followed the GDP, in partic-
ular since late 90’s.30Investment, on the other hand, has maintained a constant
co-movement to output of around 0.90 for the entire sample period. So, whereas
investment had always been an important component of output (via aggregate de-
mand), consumption had become increasingly so over the past 15 years.
The volatility of investment has been more or less constant since 1953 of between
four to six times that of output, with record troughs centered around mid-70’s (first
oil shock), early 80’s (supply-side reforms and early Volcker policies), and late 00’s
(the Great Recession). The troughs of mid-70’s (following a negative supply-side
shock) and late 00’s (following the financial shocks) are accompanied by a record
fall of 40 percent below the trend in asset prices. A possible explanation could be
that firms were forced to sell off their assets to satisfy the margin calls on their debt.
The result is a bearish stock market associated with a fall in output.
Yet, the wealth effects from movements in asset prices on consumption might be
another reason for the tight co-movement between asset prices and output.31Starting
from the second half of 1990’s, the correlation of asset prices has become as high
28GDP volatility fell by 40 percent going from 1950’s to 1960’s and 62 percent going from 1970’s
to 80’s, but rose 85 percent going from 1960’s to 70’s and 74 percent going from 1990’s to 2000’s.
29Some macroeconomic models have recently started to incorporate a Markov-switching mech-
anism to shocks/monetary policy in the model, such as Svensson and Williams (2008), Davig and
Leeper (2011), or Liu et al (2011).
30The correlation coefficient with output went from 0.21 in the 90’s, to 0.89 in 00’s.
31Dynan and Maki (2001), and Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) find a tight relationship between
consumption, household wealth, and stock price movements. Stock price movements influence
household wealth, which in turn effect consumption via households’ contemporaneous and future
budget sets. The direct wealth effects show up quickly, and last for several quarters. Lettau and
Ludvigson (2002) use a version of the permanent income model but adapt to to allow for a direct
link between household optimization and stock returns. When consumption is above (below) the
shared trend with labor and asset incomes, consumers are expecting the stock return to rise (fall),
and therefore adapt their current and future consumption based on these expectations. Dynan and
Maki (2001) estimate that an additional dollar of wealth leads households with moderate securities
holdings to increase consumption between 5 cents and 15 cents.
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as that of consumption and investment, while the volatility of asset prices, just as
consumption, more than doubled over the second half of 1990’s.32
Productivity and hours worked are procyclical, as well as less volatile than out-
put.33We observe the same pattern in real disposable personal income. However,
since 1990’s (and contrary to wages) labor productivity, measured by output per
hour and person, has become less procyclical, while the number of hours worked has
not changed. A possible reason could be that the number of hours worked rather
than productivity has increasingly determined the more recent wage levels in the
US.
Let us finalize this section by analyzing the external sector. We can largely
divide it into two regimes: the highly volatile and weakly procyclical pre-1980 period
compared to the much smoother and more (business) cycle driven post-1980’s.34The
reduction in the volatility of current account balance and net exports in the post-
1980 period coincides with the reduction in volatility of both the real and narrow
exchange rate. Linking these observations to international finance theory, it might
imply that since the exchange rate risk was reduced, the firms were able to perform
a more stable planning of exports and imports, reducing the volatility of net exports
and the current account balance.
4.2.2. Monetary aggregates
We have included information on the monetary base, M1, M2, as well as the velocities
of respective money stocks. In general, all five series are procyclical, but since the
financial liberalization of early 1980’s, both the duration and the amplitude of the
cycles for all the monetary series have become more accentuated.35The volatilities
of the various monetary series increased significantly, in particular the adjusted
monetary base that turned three times more volatile in only one decade from 1990’s
to 2000’s. This means that the demand and supply of both narrow and broad
money increased a lot as well as became much more persistent since the credit
32While S&P500 was approximately five times more volatile than output up to mid-90’s, the
volatility intensified to eleven times that of output by late 90’s, and 00’s. This is analogous to
consumption, which went from approximately as volatile as GDP throughout most of the sample
period, to twice as volatile as output by late 90’s and 00’s.
33Productivity and hours worked are captured by three series: Total weekly hours of production
by all workers, aggregate hours worked and output per hour and person.
34Both looking at the current account balance, and net exports.
35Except for the 1970’s for M1, and velocity of M2, 1990’s for M2-M1, and 00’s for the money
supply indicators, adjusted monetary base, M1, and M2-M1, when they were all countercyclical.
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liberalization, suggesting high and lasting credit expansions (contractions) during
upturns (downturns).
Turning to the predictive power of the monetary series we find, similar to the
studies by Stock and Watson (1998), and Schwartz (2005) that prior to 1980’s, M2
was a good predictor of output movements. Note, however, that this predictive
power has eroded since the late 1980’s.36This is possibly a consequence from two
factors: the change of Fed’s target from money supply to inflation resulting in a
less direct link between the broad money and output cycles, and the financial in-
novation which has caused a large expansion in the broad commercial bank money
M3, meaning that M3 rather than M2 is a better representation of the true money
supply in the economy. We would need to estimate a set of structural equations
(either by applying SVAR or cointegration equations) in order to confirm the un-
derlying reasons behind the fall in predictive power of M2, which (while interesting)
is outside the scope of the current work.
4.2.3. Prices
Prices are countercyclical, which in the literature is interpreted as a proof of the
stickiness of firm prices on the aggregate level.37However, all three price indices
have turned procyclical around 2000, with the largest shift occurring in the PPI.
Contrary to the CPIU and the GDP deflator, the PPI is more volatile than out-
put. Linking this observation to firm flows, we expect (intermediary) firm margins
and production plans to be more extensively affected by macroeconomic ups- and
downturns, since their ability to pass on price inflation of raw materials, or pro-
duction costs to final products will largely be determined by the general economic
outlook. In upturns, this capacity will be higher since households spend more and
36Also in line with the findings of Feldstein and Stock (1994) and Friedman and Kuttner (1998).
37Indeed, Chadha and Prasad (1994), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Pakko (2000), Chevalier
et al (2000), and more recently Sheedy and Guimaraes (2009), and Kehoes and Midrigan (2010)
find that prices are countercyclical since the end of WW II, reflecting the stickiness in the firm
setting of prices at the aggregate level. Chevalier and Kashyap (2001) attribute the countercyclical
nature of prices to the countercyclical mark-ups of retailers, which account for the majority of
the countercyclical price movements (and not the manufacturing industry). Alternatively, Sheedy
and Guimaraes (2009) argue that the strategic substitutability of sales is what makes prices, while
flexible on the micro level, sticky on the aggregate. Since a firm’s incentive to have a sale decreases
in the number of other firms having sales, they face less incentives to vary their prices (even in the
absence of costs in varying sales), and thus monetary policy has large real effects. Similarly, Kehoes
and Midrigan (2010) reason that since most changes in prices on micro level are temporary rather
than regular, the nominal price returns quickly to its pre-existing level. Since temporary changes
cannot offset monetary policy shocks well and regular price changes occur much less frequently,
the prices on aggregate appear as sticky.
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firms have easier access to equity or external credit which makes it easier for them
to deal with rising prices in raw materials or to fund capital equipment acquisitions,
while in downturns this capacity is restricted from both ends (Clark, 1995). This
variation in cost pass-through to consumers might be one reason why production and
(via the flow of fund constraint) investment varies so much over the cycle (more on
this in the next subsection). Future work should employ empirical tests to validate
this hypothesis.38
4.3. Balance sheets and financial prices
Next, let us look at the balance sheets of firms, households, financial intermediaries,
federal government, and the external sector described in 1.2. We are primarily
interested in capturing any persistent patterns over the business cycle during the
past 60 years, as well as any changes to these over the most recent cycles.
4.3.1. Firm financing and the balance sheet
For flows, we contrast profits, real investment, and capital prices as represented by
S&P500 (on the left-hand side of the flow equation 4) against real compensation per
hour (on the right-hand side of 4). For stocks, we concentrate on total assets, total
liabilities, net worth, total loans taken by firms, and total corporate sector debt.
Let us describe the standard mechanism linking firm stock and flow decisions.
The standard mechanisms for financially constrained firms is as follows.
pit + stkt−1 + bt = rdt dt−1 + qtpkt + wt−1lt + Et[st+1]kt (10)
bt ≤ nt (11)
θt+1 =
bt
nt
(12)
rct >> θt (13)
Firms use their profits, pit, capital gains from previous period, stkt−1, and new
borrowing bt to re-pay existing debt r
d
t dt−1, pay their input costs (physical capital
38To the best of our knowledge, a formal exploration of this causal link has not been performed.
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costs, qtpkt and wages, wt−1lt) and invest in new capital kt, contingent on the ex-
pected price of capital on the stock market in the next period, Et[st+1].
39However,
their demand for investment exceeds their internal funds they hold, which means
that they have to demand external funding to satisfy their investments. They do
this by either raising new debt, new equity, or via traditional bank loans, bt (de-
pending on the opportunity costs between the various types of corporate funding
and the maturity of finances they require). However, due to adverse selection and
moral hazard problems in the debt/credit markets between debtors and creditors,
creditors require a collateral from debtors (11 and 12). Net worth, nt is usually used
as the collateral. The higher the value of the collateral, the smaller the impact of
asymmetric information on the repayment of the loan, and therefore the lower the
loan repayment rate, θt+1 will be (Hubbard, 1990). In cases where a collateral is
not demanded, the risk premium that debtors will have to pay for their credit, rct
is significantly higher in order to compensate for the higher default risks. Hence,
firms exposure to stock prices is two-sided. On one side it determines their invest-
ment demand (flows), and the value of the firm net worth (stocks).40On the other,
it determines how much debt they can raise. The more leveraged the firm is, the
higher is the exposure to stock price movements, and therefore the more procyclical
will be the firm balance sheet.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (2002), higher indebtedness will lead to higher
probability of financial contagion inside the business sector, even to sections that
are not financially constrained, since user costs of assets must change in order for
asset markets to clear, influencing thus the price of capital for the unconstrained
firms as well. In addition, there is the liquidity contagion effect via debt repayment.
A negative shock to liquidity might cause delay, or even default on debt repayment
in one link of the chain, resulting in a disruption of the production there. An
accumulation of non-performing loans can further cause widespread loss in output.
Finally, the timing of the debt restructuring matters. In the face of a negative
credit supply shock, Almeida et al (2009) show that firms with long-term debt
maturing right at, or after the credit crisis in late 2007 reduced investment by 10
percent more than firms whose debt was scheduled to mature well beyond 2008.
On aggregate, this represents approximately one-third of the pre-crisis investment
levels. This implies that firms that will be the most constrained by the shock are the
39From time to time they also use it to improve their production technology and invest in labor.
40Since net worth is the current value of the capital stock accumulated in the firm.
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ones that are obliged to restructure their debt at the time, or right after the shock.
Since the probability of having to restructure the debt at the time of (or right after)
a negative credit supply shock is the highest for short-term debt (because of the
very short duration of such contracts), firms who largely hold this type of debt on
their balance sheets (mostly firms with high investment growth perspectives, loosely
regulated (Barclay and Smith, 1995), or large in size (Ozkan, 2000)) vis-a`-vis the
target group identified in Almeida et al (2009) will face the largest limits on the
flexibility to restructure the debt, forcing them to prioritize the debt repayment to
other expenditures.
4.3.2. Firm balance sheet
Starting with the flow variables, they are all procyclical. Whereas the procyclicality
of investment has remained high, the procyclical movements of firm profits and real
compensation have decreased over time. For stocks, we observe a similar pattern.
However, while for most of the sample period firm liabilities have been around twice
as procyclical as firm assets, the opposite has occurred since the 90’s. Hence there
is a miss-match in the exposure of the two sides of firm balance sheet to cyclical
fluctuations.
Next, debt of corporates became approximately thirty times more procyclical
since 1980’s compared to 1970’s, while the volatility has turned two to three times
higher. The same pattern applies to firm net worth. More generally we note that
firm stocks have become four times more cyclical and twice as volatile since 1980’s
compared to previous episodes. Linking it to the equations in the above subsection,
one reason for the increased volatility in the debt series over the past two decades
might be the increased volatility in equity prices, which increased the volatility of
net worth, and via the collateral channel, made debt much more volatile.
Moreover, the doubling in volatility of firm (total) assets and liabilities confirms
further this interpretation. More volatile stock prices, via two channels of transmis-
sion onto firm balance sheet, did not only result in more volatile debt-liabilities (as
described above), but also in more volatile assets, via the capital value (wealth) ef-
fect. An interesting implication from this would be to analyse how ’non-fundamental’
movements in market equity prices influence the corporate balance sheet, the firm
financing conditions, the default rates, and the production in the economy. That is
the focus of the next chapter in this book.
28
4.3.3. Household balance sheet - assets
Following the flow of fund relation for households in expression 1, we have included
information on real disposable personal income, household deposits, corporate equi-
ties held by households, and residential investment. In addition, we have included
stocks such as assets, household deposits, corporate equities held by households, li-
abilities, net worth, net worth/real disposable personal income. Further, we include
more detailed information on the type of liabilities households hold by including
the variables residential mortgages, household consumer credit, household consumer
credit issued by corporates, and total household sector debt.41
Teplin (2001) noted that households in the first quarter of 2001 had more than
six and one-half dollars in tangible and financial assets for each dollar of disposable
income, and that the proportion of assets invested in corporate equities had increased
dramatically, from 15 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in early 2000. Looking at both
the correlations and volatilities in our data, this seems to be in line with what Teplin
already observed in 2001.
While household assets have always been procyclical, its procyclicality increased
dramatically during 1990’s, and by 2000’s, the co-movement of assets to output had
become almost perfect (0.864), same as for corporate equities held by households
(0.833), and net worth (0.938).42At the same time, household deposits have become
less procyclical, turning into slightly countercyclical during the past two decades.
The strong co-movement between assets and equities held by households, rather
than deposits points to the fact that households have increasingly preferred to allo-
cate their savings in corporate equities (and other riskier products), rather than the
traditional deposits. This means that the pressure to adjust their balance sheet and
de-leverage in recessions, measured by the debt-to-asset ratio, has increased over
time since the value of their assets (the denominator) falls increasing the burden of
their debt and thus forcing them to de-leverage faster. Equally, assets and equities
held by households have become more than twice as volatile since the late 1990’s,
while the volatility of net worth has increased by a factor of 5. Thus a more un-
stable and cycle-driven asset side of the household balance sheet during the past
two decades has increased the risks and imbalances faced by households, and the
pressure to pay-off their debt in recessions has significantly increased (as we will see
41Household deposits and corporate equities can be used both for the stock and the flow analyses.
42Moreover, even when we divide household net worth by real disposable personal income, we
find that the co-movement with output has simply increased since 90’s, peaking at 0.912 in 2000’s.
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below). Another result of a higher portion of assets coming from equities is that the
exposure of household balance sheet to stock market movements has increased.
4.3.4. Household balance sheet - liabilities
We saw in the long-run relations section how over time household debt had been
accumulating at a faster pace than both household assets and output, in particular
during the expansionary episodes over the past 20 years. What we also find is that
debt, which always had a positive co-movement with output, had turned significantly
more procyclical since mid-90’s. Looking into the components of debt we note that
the strongest link in terms of the evolution of correlations and volatilities is between
total debt and household mortgages, followed by consumer credit. We interpret this
as household mortgages being the most important driver of household debt.
We also find that consumption and debt have both become more procyclical
and more volatile over time, while the opposite is true for real disposable income.
Linking these observations to household flow of funds in 1, it means that household
spending has increasingly been financed by higher debt rather than personal dispos-
able income, which leads to significantly larger contractions in consumption during
recessions, since the margin calls on debt have increased.
4.3.5. Household balance sheet - the mechanisms
We have just seen that a larger portion of savings has been placed in riskier products
which are driven by the price movements on the stock markets, resulting in more
cyclical and volatile assets over the past two decades. Net worth has also become
significantly more volatile during the same period. At the same time, the debt
burden of households, measured by debt-to-asset ratio or debt-to-output ratios, has
increased and household spending has increasingly been financed by higher debt
rather than personal disposable income. The total effect on household balance sheet
has been a more volatile and uncertain inflow as well as outflow, creating internal
imbalances in the household sector. But these effects were not directly felt by
households before the Great Recession. Why? There are two explanations for this
in the literature (Teplin, 2001).
First, the rise in financial engineering, which has lead to a sharp development of
various financial products (reducing households’ burden of carrying debt) has meant
that in early 2000’s, the true imbalances of the household sector were not visible.
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Longer loan maturities that households for the first time could access in the 90’s
had made it possible to hold higher outstanding amounts without increasing the
servicing burden, since the periodic payments were lowered for a given amount of
debt. At the same time, options such as variable interest rate provisions, and flexible
down-payment requirements broadened the pool of eligible borrowers, and allowed
households, who in standard cases would not receive a credit, to get one (Aron et
al (2008), and Muellbauer (2008)). As long as the expectations about employment
and income conditions of those households were positive, and there were no serious
doubts regarding the size and composition of household sector assets, the stock of
debt could continue to accumulate without directly affecting the debt burden, or
the flows of consumers.
Second, the rise in home equity loans, which initially were only shifting the
composition of household sector debt to mortgages, became over time a more general
way of obtaining consumer (and other more liquid) credits. So by using housing
equity as collateral, households could access credit for multiple purposes. As long
as the value of home equity increased, the debt burden for households decreased. In
addition, with the declining mortgage rates and falling processing costs of loans, the
pool of households accessing credit increased, i.e. the share of indebted households
increased.
But, once expectations about future equity- and housing prices deteriorated (in-
cluding expectations about future macroeconomic performance), caused by e.g. a
negative financial, expectation or supply shock, the high debt burden became a
powerful constraint on household flow decisions in late 2007. This is possibly why
we see historically the sharpest drop in consumption, household debt, mortgages,
assets, corporate equities held by households, and net worth around 2008.
4.3.6. Financial intermediaries - banks
We will briefly compare the balance sheets of traditional banks versus non-bank
financial intermediaries. In general, we observe a much higher diversity in patterns
compared to either firms or households.
The financial de-regulation of 1980’s and the subsequent move towards a market-
based financial system has deeply changed the structure of the balance sheets of
both bank and non-bank financial intermediaries. Roughly speaking, we can divide
financial sector funding structure into two periods: the pre- and post-1990. In
the traditional banking intermediation, banks take deposits from households and
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transform them into credit for households and firms in need of external financing. In
upturns, the quantity of credit available is higher, since depositors are less risk averse
(thus less concerned about the use of their deposits and demanding lower return)
and banks can more easily use their deposits for credit creation. In downturns,
however, depositors become more risk averse (leading to a higher probability of
them withdrawing the liquidity or demanding higher return on their deposits) and
banks, doubtful of the debt-repayment conditions of borrowers, restrict their credit
provisions. As a result, bank assets are procyclical under this funding model. Our
early sample period confirms this pattern. At the same time, bank liabilities lead the
cycle, which means that the amount of deposits available before an up- or downswing
determines the amount of loans that banks could issue.
However, the financial reforms that followed the recessions in the 1970’s per-
mitted the banks to turn to capital markets, and non-bank financial intermediaries
for raising funds.43As a result, banks became less reliant on traditional household
deposits for their loan expansions, and more on capital market (Adrian and Shin,
2010b). Since capital markets are more volatile than households’ propensity to de-
posit, the consequence from an increasing reliance on capital market funding has
been that bank liabilities have become almost three times more volatile over the
past two decades compared to 1980’s. At the same time, bank assets turned more
than one and one-half times more volatile over the same period, probably because
the availability of funding on capital markets also determined banks’ capacity for
balance sheet expansion, making asset side also more reliant on haircuts and general
capital market fluctuations. Moreover, both bank assets and bank liabilities became
highly procyclical during the same period.
4.3.7. Financial intermediaries - non-bank financial intermediaries
Two key characteristics of non-bank financial intermediaries is that their balance
sheet is short-term in nature, and they pursue procyclical, or maximum permissi-
ble leverage (i.e. the ratio of total assets to equity is large when total assets are
43The financial reforms came about largely as a result of the unsustainability of the traditional
intermediation chain since depositors’ willingness to lend remained low, and the high Federal Funds
rate meant that banks were limited in providing new loans, even during the brief economic upturns
during this episode. As a result, both bank assets and liabilities did not move with the general
cycle, and the volatility of both series increased, reflecting this uncertainty. Because of these
shortcomings in the traditional intermediation structure and the low possibilities for expansion
(since banks were constantly constrained by the amount of deposits withheld within the bank),
banks were pressured for reforming their financing structure.
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large).44Any appreciation in the value of their equity results in an increase in col-
lateralized borrowing, on for instance the repo market, in order to maximize their
margins (Adrian and Shin, 2010a, 2010b). To illustrate this, assets of non-bank
financial intermediaries grew ten times that of banks, or 800 times its size before
the financial de-regulation of early 1980’s (Adrian and Shin, 2010b). As a result,
the amount of liquidity supplied on the capital markets has been enormous in the
two decades preceding 2007. However, since there is a strong positive relation be-
tween assets and leverage, and assets are marked-to market (Adrian and Shin, 2010a,
2010b), the vulnerability of their balance sheet to market price movements is very
high. That is why in our data we observe an increase in the volatility of non-bank
assets by a factor of four going from 80’s to 00’s.
Because of the high importance that non-bank financial intermediaries play in
providing funding to banks (and in turn to firms and households) following from the
early days of financial liberalization, we should see a strong co-movement between
the balance sheet of non-bank financial intermediaries and the overall business cycle.
This is indeed what we find in the data. While in the pre-1990 period, assets of
non-bank intermediaries did not particularly follow the business cycle, and liabilities
lagged the cycle, since 90’s, both series had become so strongly cycle-driven that
in 2000’s, the correlation of non-bank assets (liabilities) with output was as high as
0.962 (0.865).45
4.3.8. Federal government
For the federal government, we are mostly interested in the sustainability of gov-
ernment finances, and have therefore only included explicit series on total debt.
Nevertheless, we have also included a measure of government deficit/surplus called
government savings which will also capture the balancing of the Federal budget (and
thus the budget sustainability) in each period. For flows, we have government con-
sumption, government non-defense investment, and government defense investment
on the spending side, and net government receipts (net of transfers), and debt on
44The only constraint they face is either the regulatory cap on leverage, or the capital re-
quirement ratio. Many classes of ‘shadow banks’ were however not bound by these regulatory
requirements, since these did not include ’shadow bank’ activities.
45Therefore, the main source of liquidity for the entire economy lies with the non-bank interme-
diaries, and any shocks affecting their leverage (or asset value) cause disruptions in the liquidity
flow, resulting (with some delay) in a recession. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), and Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011) explore the effects from disruptions on the interbank mar-
ket on the supply of liquidity in the economy within the novel funding structure of the financial
sector explored here.
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the income side.
Federal debt is a good predictor of the general business cycle since it has lead
it for most of the sample period. It is also two to three times more volatile than
output. Looking at the raw (unfiltered) series, you also find that the series has ex-
perienced a tremendous growth since the Reagan period. To put it into perspective,
whereas US government debt was approximately 1 trillion dollars, or one-sixth of the
GDP in 1980, in 2012, the accumulated value was 16 times higher, or 120 percent
of the GDP.46This means that the government has been running constant deficits
since early 1980’s. Our government savings series confirm this, and moreover point
out that the historically speaking, the two largest peaks in deficits (or troughs in
savings) were in early 2000’s, following the Republican Tax Reforms.47During those
years, the deficit rose (or savings fell) by 225 and 250 percent above (below) the
trend (see graph III.14). Hence we should expect a heavier constraint on future
government spending and a less sustainable fiscal balance, since debt repayments
will need to be prioritised in the future. Moreover, taking into account that an
increasing share of that debt is being held by foreign investors, the sustainability of
the US public finances are increasingly being determined by the external demand
for its debt.48More on this in the subsequent subsection.
Government revenues have increasingly followed the general movement of the
business cycle over time. For the past two decades it became almost perfectly pro-
cyclical. For government outflows, we see a diverse picture. While expenditure and
defense investments are both countercyclical, non-defense investment is procyclical.
It means that the government prioritises projects which have long-run impacts on
the economy in upturns, while it prefers short-run policies to fill the consumption
gap in downturns.49Lastly, government expenditure has a very similar volatility to
output and is less volatile than any of the other flow series, suggesting that the
largest share of the expenditure series are automatic stabilizers since these are auto-
matically triggered when output (and other variables) fall below a certain threshold.
Hence the series should be countercyclical, and have a very similar volaility pattern
46Source: Federal Reserve St. Louis database.
47The 2001 EGTRRA (Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act) and the 2003
JGTRRA (Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act) tax reforms.
48In July 2012, 48 percent of US public debt was held by foreign investors, mainly Japan and
China. Source: US Treasury-Data Chart Center. Data retrieved from Bruegel database on April
2013 shows a lower foreign bond holding at 34 percent.
49See, amongst others, Baxter and King (1993) for the various effects of different government
spending policies.
34
to output, in accordance with our observations in the data.
4.3.9. The external sector
Commencing with the federal debt owned by foreigners (which we briefly discussed
in the previous subsection) the series is largely procyclical, with significantly longer
cycles than both the output and total federal debt. However, over the past decade it
has become countercyclical, less volatile and with (shorter) frequency which follows
more tightly the cycle of output. This is in line with our previous discussion where
we noted that foreign investors have played an increasing role in buying the Federal
debt. One implication from this is that the ability of the US government to execute
their (stabilization) policies and the sustainability of the public finances are being
handed over to the external sector and the propensity of foreigners to demand its
debt. This makes the Federal budget significantly more exposed to external shocks,
and thus more uncertain.
Turning to the foreign direct investment series, we observe strong similarities
between the FDI in US and US FDI abroad over the cycle. The second moments
of both series are very similar, and while for most of the postwar period they are
countercyclical, both turned procyclical around early 2000. This suggests that both
the US investment abroad as well as the foreign investment in the US are determined
by the same (latent) factors. Moreover, while both FDI series dropped during the
Great Recession, the drop has not been anywhere close to the heavy swings of the
1970’s and the contractions experienced in both types of FDI during the mid-70’s
recession. The smaller contraction during the most recent crisis could by large be
attributed to the reduction in volatility of the exchange rates (both the narrow and
the broad real) of the US dollar since the early 1980’s, which we observed in the
above subsection. Thus in relative terms, the foreign direct investment has remained
more or less untouched by the latest recession.
4.3.10. Financial rates and spreads
To conclude our business cycle analysis, let us turn to financial rates and spreads.
We identify important differences between the short-term and the long-term spreads.
While both types (short and long-term spreads) are less volatile than output,
the long-term are less volatile than the short-term spreads. In addition, while the
short-term spreads experienced their historically highest peak during the 1970’s,
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as a result of the high volatility in the Funds rate/3-month T-bill rate to which
it is benchmarked to, the long-term spreads rose the most during the most recent
recession.50So the relative standard deviation of, for instance, the corporate risk
spread was 83% higher in 2000’s compared to 1970’s, or 76% higher compared to
1980’s. Similar differences are observed for the other two long-term spreads. The
risks were therefore priced in the longer end of the market.
Turning to correlations, we observe a less unified pattern amongst short-term
spreads compared to the long-term ones. Eurodollar- and deposit spreads have been
countercyclical for the entire period, prime spread has mostly been procyclical, while
the others have changed their frequency pattern over time. During 1970’s and 80’s,
the three remaining short-term spreads were countercyclical.51However, in 90’s they
became procyclical, and remained so during 2000’s. The only exception is the 3-
month LIBOR spread that by 2000 had again become countercyclical.
On the long side, however, the three spreads are all countercyclical. An impli-
cation of this more unified countercyclical nature of the long-term spreads is that
borrowers prefer to take on long-term debt in expansions. The default costs priced
into the spread are low, and so the price of a long-term loan is low. However, in
downturns, this type of debt becomes less desirable/demanded as the spreads widen
because of a higher probability of default of borrowers (increasing thus the costs
of borrowing). At that point, the short-term debt becomes more attractive since
the lending spread is small (procyclical) and (since 1980’s) its volatility over the
cycle is low, turning it into a more secure source of funding for liquidity constrained
borrowers.
Our findings regarding the shifting pattern in correlations of (short-term) fi-
nancial spreads are in line with the broader literature on the predictive power of
spreads. Using VAR, GARCH and other regression methods, they find that only
during limited periods of time are spreads useful in forecasting economic and/or
financial performances.52For models, this possibly implies that not all frictions in
the financial industry cause contractions in the real sector since agents can access
other types of credit when problems in one segment emerge. As we noted, the at-
50The short-term spreads we consider in our sample are the 3-month LIBOR, 3-month TED,
3-month Prime rate, 3-month Eurodollar, 3-month Deposit-and 3-month Paper-bill spreads while
on the long-end we consider the AAA-, BAA-, and Corporate risk spreads.
513-month LIBOR-, 3-month TED- and 3-month Paper-bill spreads.
52See Friedman and Kuttner (1998), Emery (1999), Gertler and Lown (2000), Weber (2002),
Ewing et al (2009) amongst others for a more thorough discussion on the forecast power of financial
rates and spreads.
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tractiveness of long-term debt over the short-term one changes at different points
of the business cycle, meaning that under some circumstances, firms/households (or
even banks) can substitute one for the other and avoid being liquidity constrained.
5. Decomposition of output growth
Having considered the US postwar aggregate demand side, let us now look at the
factors of production that have contributed the most in shaping the US output
growth cycles. For this purpose, we have performed a growth accounting exercise
where we have decomposed output growth into growth in supply side factors such as
capital, labor and total factor productivity (henceforth TFP).53The capital series we
use is capital stock and for labor we use total hours of work of all workers per week.
Because capital stock is only reported from 1960:I, our growth accounting sample
also starts from this period.54Table I.2 reports the results from the growth accounting
exercise for the entire sample (1960:IV-2011:II), as well as for each business cycle
expansion and recession following NBER’s business cycle dates. A business cycle
expansion is defined as the period between a trough and peak in NBER’s list of
dates, and vice versa for a recession. Figure III.2 plot the growth rates of each
component over time, as well as the percentage contribution of each factor to the
reported output growth. Therefore, for periods where the contribution of a factor
to output growth has the opposite sign to output (for instance, the growth in GDP
is negative, while the growth in capital is positive), the contribution of that factor
has been minimal and thus we have reported it as 0 percent in our table.
From Figures III.2, we find that TFP explains the majority of output growth
since 1960. It grew by 2.12 percent per year and accounts for 62 percent of the
movement in output in the complete sample. Capital is the second most important
driver with a growth of 1.325 percent per year, while labor has the least impact
on output (0.22 percent contraction per annum). However, a closer look at output
growth over the business cycle reveals a more diverse picture. During most expan-
sions, TFP followed by capital are the main drivers of output growth, with 1.842 and
1.26 percent annual growth on average. However during recessions, it is labor (with
a contraction of 4.151 percent per annum on average) that contributes the most to
contractions in output. Taking into account that during those periods, the growth in
53See Mourre (2009) for a similar and more detailed growth accounting exercise for the EU.
54Data on capital stock was collected from OECD’s Economic Outlook database in Reuter’s
EcoWin.
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TFP (and capital) are still positive and higher (smaller), it means that contractions
mainly result in firms reducing the hours worked for their employees55while making
them more productive.
In addition, we find that the highest growth in capital and TFP occurred during
the dot.com bust period of 2001 (1.95 and 4.89 percent per yeear), while the lowest
has been during the most recent expansion (0.69 and 1.13 percent per year). For
labor, on the other hand, the highest growth was during the 1960’s (2.08 percent per
year), and the highest contraction during the most recent recession (-6 percent per
year). From a supply side point of view, this means that the drastic drop in labor
hours during the financial crises coupled with the weak growth in TFP during the
most recent expansion can possibly be one of the explanations to the currently weak
recovery of US output.56Since many workers are unemployed, and the remaining ones
have not compensated for the loss in the input factor by becoming more productive
(like in the previous recession), this has resulted in an overall drop of production
capacity. This is supported by other recent studies in the literature.
Broadbent (2012) finds that the main reason for the most recent contraction in
the UK economic cycle has been a contraction in the supply side, rather than the
standard demand-side optics emphasized in most financial friction models. He ar-
gues that a combination of uneven demand across sectors combined with an impaired
financial system (due to its inability to effectively reallocate resources sufficiently
quickly to respond to shocks) has lead to a reduction in aggregate output per em-
ployee. While Chadha and Warren (2012) find an equally important role for the
efficiency or labor wedge as the key driver for the most recent UK contraction, they
however reason that it is not necessarily the shocks originating from the supply side
of the economy that lie at the centre. Their business cycle accounting exercise shows
that asset price shocks might equally appear in the supply-side wedges, suggesting
that the supply side works as a propagator for shocks originated elsewhere. Linking
it with our overall findings that TFP and capital are the strongest drivers of US
postwar output, we suggest to future models to equally consider the supply-side as
a propagator of, for instance financial shocks, since these (sharp and unexpected)
movements in financial prices alter the ratio of outputs to inputs, or the supply
of inputs. Many financial friction models have concentrated on the demand-side
55Either by firing more staff, or reduce the number of hours for everyone.
56Larry Summers and other prominent economists have recently referred to this phenomenon as
a ‘secular stagnation’ since there are little perspectives for these factors to grow in the foreseable
future.
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effects, but less on the supply side (production) factors.
6. How well do financial friction models capture these stylized facts?
The past few years have been unprecedented in terms of the number of new financial
friction models that try to explore how activities and shocks inside financial markets
might cause macroeconomic disruptions. While a rigorous assessment of those is still
missing, they do provide fresh perspectives on how the arrangements in the financial
industry drive the business cycle, in particular when shocks are generated within that
industry. However, a question remains regarding how well these models replicate
the stylized facts and mechanisms that we have outlined above. Do we observe
the same business cycle patterns as in the data? Do they contain the mechanisms
that we explore in this paper? While one might argue that in the real economy, we
observe multiple shocks of different magnitudes simultaneously, implying that we
will always observe some differences between the data and model output, a good
model will nevertheless succeed in capturing most if not all the data moments.57
The list of models we assess is not exhaustive, but rather representative of the
new generation of macro-financial models that have emerged over the past few years.
We have chosen models that are significantly different from each other, both in terms
of transmission mechanisms and model moments. We hope to give the reader guid-
ance on what those models manage to capture and where their limitations are. We
follow a version of the taxonomy outlined in the introduction of this book to cate-
gorize the models. The differentiation is based on whether the impulses/shocks and
propagation mechanisms in these models are real and/or financial-monetary.58While
the models resist in being perfectly nested in any of these categories, the classifi-
cation should be instructive, and viewed from a relative (rather than absolute)
perspective. Models that mainly use real shocks and real propagations are Mendoza
(2010) and Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011).59Similarly, the financial ac-
57In a model, we separate the shocks and estimate/calibrate them to a certain value.
58In other words, do the key impulses originate from the financial sector, or from real activity,
and are these shocks propagated through the balance sheets of financial intermediaries and the
financial sector, or via the non-financial segment of the economy, including households, firms, the
external sector, or the government.
59Following the classification of Bean et al (2002), while these two models do include a broad
credit channel, since financial intermediaries are modeled as a veil, the propagation of shocks occurs
outside of the financial sector. Therefore we consider that as a real propagation channel since the
shocks are transmitted via optimizations of real, rather than financial, agents. This also applies to
the Gilchrist et al (2009) model.
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celerator model of Gilchrist, Ortiz and Zakrajsek (2009) includes real propagations,
but they simulate the model using financial/monetary shocks. On the other end
we have the Boz and Mendoza (2010) with financial propagations, but real shocks.
Finally, we include four models where both the propagations and the shocks are
financial/monetary. Those are Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010), Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011).60For
a longer description of the model mechanisms, please refer to Appendix II.
Our quantitative analysis is based on the quantitative results that are provided
in the papers.61The comparative results are reported in Tables I.8 to I.11. The table
abbreviations Pos. and Neg. stand for a positive and negative correlation with
output, and when the model correlation is ambiguous in the impulse responses,
but clearly different from the data, we have labeled it as Very Different. For the
sake of clarity, we have divided our analysis into three parts. In the first one, we
do a moment matching in terms of correlation, in the second we do the same for
volatilities, while in the third (and based on the mechanisms identified in the data),
we provide guidance on how future macroeconomic models can incorporate these
and tackle the challenges that they currently face.
60Another way of categorizing the models is to view them as extensions (except for Boz and
Mendoza, 2010) of the baseline financial accelerator (FA) mechanism in various directions. The
first category of models look at the endogenous effects of banking. So, Christiano, Motto and
Rostagno (2010) add an explicit banking sector, and (specifically) examine the evolution of credit
supply (and demand) following a wide range of real and financial shocks. Gertler and Karadi (2011)
also include a banking sector, but their intermediaries face endogenously determined balance sheet
constraints. They use it to study the (financial and real) effects from unconventional monetary
policy. While the basic framework is very similar to Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) extend the model to include a state-contingent interbank market, and analyze the
impact that financial shocks have on the macroeconomy by altering the interbank credit supply.
Hillberg and Holmayr (2011) take the modeling of interbank markets a step further by including
heterogeneous banks, and study the impacts on the supply of credit in the repo markets from
variations in the haircuts, as well as from stock market cycles. The second category of FA models
have instead focused on developing financial frictions on the real side of the economy. So, Mendoza
(2010) includes (apart from the standard collateral constraint on firms in a FA model) an additional
credit constraint on the working capital of households and examines the endogenous effects from
high debt to asset ratios on credit access, and the price and quantity of collateral. In his framework,
the powerful Fisherian debt-deflation dynamics, triggered by the tight interlinkages between the
collateral constraints of household and firms, results in disruptions in access to international capital
markets. Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011), on the other hand, extended the FA model to
an international dimension in order to establish the role of financial frictions in driving the business
cycles of an open economy.
61In most cases, this is unfortunately limited to interpretations from impulse response exercises
since a table with second moments is not provided, which means that we can only infer the sign
of the correlation between a model variable and output, but not the intensity of it. In some cases,
however, the authors do provide more extensive results, which we additionally take into account
to complement our analysis.
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6.1. Correlations: Model vs. Data
The majority of the models manage to replicate the correlations observed in the
data. Christiano et al. (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gilchrist et al. (2010),
and Gertler and Karadi (2011), replicate the true correlation coefficients for both the
real and financial (firm net worth, investment, policy rate, real rate and external fi-
nance premium) variables.62The mechanism behind this regularity is the procyclical
firm decisions, and the asymmetry in the corporate credit markets that these mod-
els include, which means that firms, because of the high demand for their products,
accumulate debt during expansions, since the value of their collateral (net worth)
increases. Banks, willing to expand their assets, expand their firm lending. However,
in contractions, the probability of default of firms increases, at the same time as the
risk aversion of banks to lend increases, pushing the lending rates up to compensate
for both effects. The result of a lower liquidity supply to firms is that their invest-
ment and production decreases. Since monetary policy is loosened to restore the
credit conditions, the finance premium rises, hence why it is countercyclical, and the
policy rate procyclical. For similar reasons, Christiano et al. (2011), and Hilberg
and Hollmayr (2011) manage to replicate all correlations, except for the nominal
interest rate.63
For the two remaining models, however, we find greater differences between
the model and the data correlations. Mendoza (2010) generates the opposite signs
for correlations of net exports and capital prices to output compared to data.64To
finish, since Mendoza and Boz (2010) provide (impulse response) results for four
model variables around a business cycle peak and trough, the comparison is slightly
different. Whereas the model manages to replicate the co-movement between most
model variables and output (except for savings, which in the model rise in upturns,
whereas they fall in the data), we find some differences in the timing of the shifts
62Because Christiano et al. (2010) provide an explicit list of exact model second moments, we
find that consumption and labor hours are more tightly correlated to output in the model compared
to data, and vice versa for investment.
63Since the interest rate is countercyclical for the monetary policy and technology shocks, and
because authors do not provide explicit second moment results, we have to interpret the signs via
impulse responses.
64Because the model assumes that net exports precede the rise in leverage, a rising leverage
pushes up the prices of domestically produced goods (via demand), resulting in the decreased price
competitiveness and the subsequent fall in net exports. In downturns, the de-leveraging leads to
a fall in prices, increasing thus the price competitiveness of domestic products, and a rise in net
exports. We find the opposite sign in the data. For capital prices, while the sign of correlation
is correct, the intensity is lower in the model since (model) prices are less responsive to drops in
investment, possibly because investment and asset prices are only linked via demand.
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in most variables around business cycle peaks and troughs. While the debt ratio
B/GDP has a sharper increase/decrease at the onset of the optimistic/pessimistic
stage in the data compared to the model, capital prices and consumption rise/fall
less sharply after a business cycle trough/peak in the data compared to the model.65
6.2. Volatilities: Model vs Data
The bigger challenge for these models lies in capturing the true volatilities.66So, for
instance, Christiano et al (2010) generate correct volatilities for labor hours, net
worth, consumption and inflation, or Gertler and Karadi (2011), who manage to
capture the true volatilities of investment, labor input, and inflation. Remembering
that both models extend the FA mechanism by including an explicit banking sector,
it appears that including an explicit intermediation sector improves the volatility
matching of the demand side variables because of the key role that the supply of
credit plays in household and firm flows.
On the other hand, the first model does less well for financial variables such as
the policy rate, external finance premium, or loans. Similarly, Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) capture the volatility of external finance premium, but for all remaining
variables, the volatilities of the variables in the models are lower than of those
observed in the data. This pattern is true for most of the models, where we note
that the model relative standard deviations are lower than those of the ones found
in the data.67Since these models only partially include the endogenous effects of
(debt) stock accumulation on the model dynamics (concentrating mainly on the
65Possibly reflecting the asymmetrically higher real effects of de-leveraging. At the peak, the
(endogenous) stock of debt is significantly higher in the data, meaning that when a negative shock
hits the economy, the de-leveraging is more accelerated, and the amplification to the real economy
is in reality more accentuated than proposed by the model. Conversely, the stock of debt at
the trough is so low that consumers take longer time to recover their wealth and start spending,
delaying thus the recovery. Finally, the rise and fall in consumption is symmetric between both
stages of the business cycle in the data, whilst they are asymmetric in the model.
66With the best performing models capturing only a handful of these.
67Except for investment in Christiano et al (2011), net worth, policy rate, and external finance
premium in Gertler and Karadi (2011), net worth of firms in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), or
leverage in Gilchrist et al (2010) where the volatility of those model variables are higher than
in the empirics. While it is difficult to establish the exact underlying reasons for it (due to the
complex structures operating in these models), because all these variables are related to firm stocks
and flows, we believe that the problem comes from the very high elasticity of firm net worth to
asset price fluctuations within the FA mechanism of these models. Since firm equity plays a pivotal
role for the real and financial decisions (and constraints) of firms, large fluctuations in this state
variable are necessary in order to generate significant amplification effects. Nolan and Thoenissen
(2009) show that a (model derived)/endogenous shock to firm equity value is the most significant
in driving the model dynamics. The side effect is, nevertheless, that it causes excessive variation
in some of the firm variables in order to generate sufficiently pronounced financial cycles.
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balance sheet of firms or banks), the full-force propagation effects of higher debt-to-
asset ratios of all sectors in the economy are not included. Therefore, the impulse
responses are smoother in the models, and the volatilities of the variables are lower
compared to the data. Let us expand on this in the next subsection.
6.3. Are there other data properties that these models omit?
So far we have only discussed and contrasted the quantitative model results that
authors have reported in their models. The choice of variables to report has entirely
been a decision of the author(s), the model, or both. However, there are a few
mechanisms we have identified in the data that these models should incorporate.
The first aspect is the effect of long-term financial ratios on model dynamics.
We saw early on in the empirical analysis that long-run ratios such as household
debt-to-asset, or consumption-output have significantly increased over the past 60
years. The models therefore need to incorporate mechanisms, such as financial
innovation, collateralized housing debt, and/or state-contingent optimizations which
would allow households (or other agents) to accumulate a larger stock of debt over
a much longer period of time than currently feasible in the financial friction models.
Another possibility is to internalize the inter-sectoral spillover effects from the chase
for margins by financial intermediaries into the optimization problems of agents.
Heavy chase for margins by non-bank financial institutions (and later banks) since
1990’s has lead to a high increase in financial market liquidity. This resulted in
intermediaries giving out credit to households (and to a certain extent firms) which
under normal circumstances would not be eligible. Hence, the new market conditions
(or state) within the financial system resulted in an alteration of the constraints that
households faced (becoming laxer) and as a result their optimization problem was
transformed. If this occured multiple times, this would allow ratios, such as debt-
to-asset or debt-to-income, to attain new values over a longer period, consequently
altering the model dynamics to such an extent that the risk preferences, technologies,
or beliefs of agents might change over time, resulting in new dynamic optimizations.
A similar point relates to the high exposure of firm balance sheets to stock price
fluctuations. In the business cycle section, we found that the higher leverage of firms
over the past two decades has meant that their balance sheet has been increasingly
vulnerable to volatile and highly procyclical stock price movements. As a result,
balance sheet of firms became increasingly procyclical and increasingly sensitive to
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downfalls in equity prices since the 90’s. While the FA mechanism captures the
effects of asset price movements on firm net worth and the credit supply, the stock
prices in the models are less volatile than the ones observed in the data. This is
mainly because the price of assets in these models is not expectations augmented and
therefore the price does not fluctuate with expectations that investors hold regarding
the future profitability of investments. Gilchrist et al (2009) and Hilberg and Holl-
mayr (2011) do include two asset prices in their model, where one is forward-looking
and the other is contingent on fundamental factors to investment, but the forward-
looking price is exogenously determined (via a parameter) and firm investment (and
therefore future net worth) is dependent on the fundamental value of assets, which
is less volatile than the forward-looking price. An interesting extension of the FA
framework would be to endogenise the wedge between the two asset prices so that
the forward-looking price is derived from the model dynamics and evolves endoge-
nously in the model. First then can one consistently study the effects of market
expectations on firms’ balance sheet and explicitly analyze the effects of high stock
price variability of firm demand and supply. As we observed in the last section of
the empirical analysis, asset price shocks are not only propagated via firms’ demand
channels, but also via the supply side (by altering the ratio of output to input, or
the supply of inputs). It would therefore be relevant to include both propagations.
Chapter 2 of the book is a contribution in this direction.
A further extension to the current models might be to capture and analyse the
effects of an increasing exposure to international shocks on the sustainability of
public finances, and the capacity of the government to counteract future recessions.
As we saw in the external balance sheet, a large share of the debt is now owned
by foreign investors. At the same time, the foreign bond holding series have turned
procyclical during the past decade. An interesting exercise would be to examine how
large negative international shocks (either in the exchange rate, or in the foreign
economy) affect the US government inflows, the capacity to issue new bonds, and
the ability to run its spending policies. At a larger scale, such an extension in the
macroeconomic models would allow academics and policy makers to analyse the
long-run effects of such shocks on the government’s future budget constraint and
it’s ability to run countercyclical (stabilisation) policies. For policy makers, it might
be of high interest to find the optimal level/percentage of foreign ownership of the
debt at which the debt portfolio is diversified, but the future government budget
constraint and it’s stabilisation capacity is not put in danger by ‘over-exposure’ to
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international shocks.
To conclude, there are a few other points which we identified in the empirical
analysis, but which the models to some extent ignore. Early on in the business
cycle analysis we noted that over the past 60 years, US output volatility had shifted
between cycles with high and low volatility. We observed a similar pattern in many
other macroeconomic aggregates. One way to capture this might be to include
a Markov-switching process where the economy switches between a high and low
volatility regime, and explore the model responses/dynamics under the two regimes
as well as examine the probability distribution of switching between the regimes.
Similarly for financial spreads we noted that the preference for long-term over short-
term debt changes over the business cycle. While long-term debt is attractive during
economic upturns (because of the low costs of borrowing), the short-term one be-
comes attractive in downturns since the spreads are less volatile (offering a more
secure source of funding) and certain segments of the short-term credit market offer
low borrowing costs. Since agents face this trade-off between different debt maturi-
ties, frictions in one segment of the financial market do not necessarily cause con-
tractions in the real sector since firms/households (or even banks) can (imperfectly)
substitute their debt and avoid being liquidity constrained. A Markov-switching
model could potentially deal with this asymmetry in financial frictions.
7. Conclusion
Studying the US economy is not only appealing because there is good quality data
available for many economic and financial variables over a long period of time,
but also because there are strong linkages between the American financial and real
cycles. Moreover, the transformation that the US financial system has undergone
since the early days of liberalization in late 1970’s has modified those linkages, and
therefore the role that financial sector plays in driving the aggregate business cycle.
This is not least apparent from the recent observations made by Cecchetti (2008,
2009), Pozsar et al (2010) and several others regarding the impact of balance sheets
explosions of non-bank financial intermediaries, households and firms on the latest
boom period of 2002-07 and the subsequent bust. We incorporate these remarks in
our enquiry of the US economy, and closely study the macro-financial co-movements
over 10 business cycles and 6 decades of quarterly observations.
We find that the standard long-run relations have persistently increased, in par-
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ticular since the financial liberalization in the 1980’s. Specifically, the more than
proportional rise in debt-to-assets of households has since 1990’s lead to a rise in the
consumption-output ratio above its long-term average. Financial engineering and
the use of equity collateralized debt as a general source of funding for households has
meant that consumers have been able to expand their spending without increasing
the debt burden on their budget constraint. Moreover over time, a larger share of
household income has come from their equity holdings (rather than wages), with
the (undesired) consequence that consumption has become increasingly sensitive to
shocks on wealth, via their increased exposure to equity price fluctuations. Future
financial friction models need to capture the stylized facts of households in a more
consistent and detailed way.
Equally, balance sheet of firms have become increasingly procyclical and volatile
since the 90’s which has lead to powerful financial contagion within the sector once
the price of assets decrease. While the FA mechanism captures the effects of asset
price movements on firm net worth and the credit supply, the stock prices in the
financial friction models are less volatile than the ones observed in the data. Future
models should include forward-looking (or expectations augmented) asset prices and
systematically study the effects of market expectations on firms’ access to credit,
default rate, investment levels, and firm assets.
Turning to the public sector, a large share of the Federal debt is now owned
by foreign investors. At the same time, the foreign bond holding series have turned
procyclical during the past decade. An interesting exercise would be to examine how
large negative international shocks (either in the exchange rate, or in the foreign
economy) affect US Federal financial inflows, the capacity to issue new bonds, and
the ability to run its spending policies. For policy makers, it might be of high
interest to find the optimal level of foreign ownership at which the debt portfolio
is diversified, but the future government budget constraint and it’s stabilisation
capacity is not put in danger by ‘over-exposure’ to international shocks.
Financial engineering and optimism lead to very rapid accumulation of stocks
(e.g. debt, equity), which result in secular increases in the long-term ratios. Macroe-
conomic models assume that these ratios are stationary in the steady state, but the
long-run analysis showed that these can persistently deviate from their long-run av-
erage. The result can be an inaccurate representation and modeling of the business
cycles. Future models should allow these ratios to vary over the long-run, and study
their effects on the evolution of business cycles.
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Appendices
I. Data and Tables
Table I.1: US Business cycle dates
Business cycle peak Business cycle trough Increase in GDP Fall in GDP
trough to peak peak to trough
July 1953 (II) May 1954 (II) - -1.93%
August 1957 (III) April 1958 (II) 12.19% -2.11%
April 1960 (II) February 1961 (I) 9.18% -0.7%
December 1969 (IV) November 1970 (IV) 48.44% 0.001%
November 1973 (IV) March 1975 (I) 13.24% -1.58%
January 1980 (I) July 1980 (III) 20.25% -0.19%
July 1981 (III) November 1982 (IV) 2.49% -1.41%
July 1990 (III) March 1991 (I) 35.6% -0.48%
March 2001 (I) November 2001 (IV) 42% 0.35%
December 2007 (IV) June 2009 (II) 15.7% -5.05%
Number of cycles 10
Average GDP increase/quarter in expansions 1.05%
Average GDP fall/quarter in recessions -.036%
Table I.2: US GDP growth decomposition
Business cycle Period GDP growth Growth in K Growth in L Growth in TFP
Whole sample 1960:IV-2011:II 3.137 1.325 -0.223 2.117
Expansion 1961V:I-1969:III 4.961 1.249 2.079 1.607
Recession 1969:IV-1970:IV 0.191 1.396 -4.362 3.45
Expansion 1971:I-1973:III 4.827 1.281 1.697 1.90
Recession 1973:IV-1975:I -0.903 1.626 -3.596 1.379
Expansion 1975:II-1979:IV 3.89 1.18 1.381 1.398
Recession 1980:I-1980:III -0.835 1.611 -4.089 1.85
Expansion 1980:IV-1981:II 2.549 1.542 -0.353 1.428
Recession 1981:III-1982:III 1.289 1.261 -2.255 2.496
Expansion 1982:IV-1990:III 4.067 1.418 0.527 2.127
Recession 1990:IV-1991:I -0.367 1.22 -3.154 1.686
Expansion 1991:II-2000:IV 3.602 1.531 0.045 2.048
Recession 2001:I-2001:III 0.681 1.944 -5.68 4.89
Expansion 2001:IV-2007:III 2.595 1.214 -1.602 3.104
Recession 2007:IV:I-2009:II -1.55 1.133 -5.922 3.725
Expansion 2009:III-2011:II 2.134 0.69 1.389 1.128
Average expansions 1960:IV-2011:II 3.578 1.263 0.52 1.842
Average recessions 1960:IV-2011:II -0.213 1.456 -4.151 2.782
Note: We decomposed GDP growth using data on capital stock and weekly hours of production. The data
was logged and transformed into yearly growth rates. Following Cobb-Douglas specification for our supply side
technology , we define the share of capital in production as 30%, whilst 70% for labour. In addition we calculate
the Solow residual based on the other input shares. This residual represents the share of technology (TFP) in
production, which we set to 70We do not expect our results to considerably differ for other specifications of the
production function, such as the CES technology. Despite being less restrictive than the Cobb-Douglas, and
being non-Hicks neutral, Almeida and Felix (2006) do not find significant differences between the supply side
shares in output growth using a CES compared to a Cobb-Douglas production function. Nevertheless, using
the former, we could in addition identify whether the TFP adjustments were caused by changes in labor or
capital productivity. One reason behind the observed similarity in results is that we are primarily interested in
the long-run production frontier, which means that we can correctly use the unitary elasticity of substitution
of Cobb-Douglas (Leon-Ledesma and Satchi, 2011).
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II. Brief outline of models
We will briefly describe the key mechanisms of the models that we evaluate in
the second part of our paper. The list of models we evaluate does not intend to
be exhaustive, but rather representative of the new generation of macro-financial
models that have emerged over the past few years.
II.1. Gilchrist, Ortiz and Zakrajsek (2009)
Based on the theoretical framework of one of the authors of this paper, the financial
accelerator BGG model (1999), this paper tries to quantify the role of the financial
accelerator in U.S. business cycle fluctuations over 1973:Q12009:Q1 period.
The theoretical framework is a standard dynamic New-Keynesian modeled a la
Smets and Wouters (2007) augmented to include the financial accelerator mecha-
nism of BGG. In particular, a financial market imperfection between lenders and
borrowers is introduced which requires borrower to post a collateral or maintain
some stake in the project in order to mitigate the agency problem associated with
such financial market imperfection. The lower the value of the collateral provided
relative to the amount borrowed, the higher the incentive of borrowers to default.
Lenders recognize these incentive problems and, consequently, demand a premium.
Because this external finance premium is increasing in the amount borrowed relative
to the borrowers collateral, and because the collateral provided is firm’s net worth,
which in turn depends directly on the value of assets it holds, declines in asset val-
ues during economic downturns result in a deterioration of borrowers balance sheets
and a rise in the premiums charged on the various forms of external finance. The
increases in external finance premiums, in turn, lead to further cuts in spending
and production. The resulting slowdown in economic activity causes asset values to
fall further and amplifies the economic downturn, the so-called financial accelerator
mechanism.
The aim of this paper is to disentangle movements in the supply and demand for
credit. They do so by incorporating a high information-content credit spread in the
Bayesian maximum likelihood estimation of the financial accelerator model. They
construct this credit-spread index using individual security-level data, which has
significant information for future economic activity. This spread serves as a proxy
for the fluctuations in the unobservable external finance premium in the model.
Movements in the high information-content credit spread are used to identify the
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structural parameters of the financial accelerator mechanism in the DSGE frame-
work and to measure the extent to which disruptions in financial markets have con-
tributed to fluctuations in the real economy during the last three and a half decades.
Their forecasting results indicate that the predictive content of this credit spread
for various measures of economic activity significantly exceeds that of widely-used
financial indicators such as the standard Baa-Treasury corporate credit spread and
indicators of the stance of monetary policy such as the shape of the yield curve or
the real federal funds rate.
II.2. Boz and Mendoza (2010)
They produce a model with financial innovation whereby agents learn by observation
’the true riskiness’ of the new environment. Financial innovation is modeled as a
structural change that introduces a regime with a higher leverage limit. Agents
know that there are two financial regimes that can materialize in any given period:
in the first state agents have continued ability to leverage at a high level, whilst
in the second, there is a switch to a lower leverage limit. They do not know the
true riskiness of the new financial environment, because they lack data with which
to estimate accurately the true regime-switching probabilities across high- and low-
leverage states. They are Bayesian learners, however, and so they learn over time
as they observe regime realizations, and in the long-run their beliefs converge to the
true regime-switching probabilities. Early realizations of states with high ability
to leverage assets into debt turn agents overly optimistic about the probability of
persistence of a high-leverage regime. On the other hand, as soon as sign of a low-
leverage state appears, agents become pessimistic about future credit prospects.
Whilst the model uses the well-known Fisherian debt-deflation mechanism (see
Mendoza (2008)) via a collateral constraint, the interaction of it with agents’ beliefs
is the novelty and introduces distortions in asset prices. This is because in the short-
run, agents’ beliefs deviate from the RE regime switching probabilities. The resulting
over- or underpricing of assets translates into over- or under-inflated collateral values
that affect the debt-deflation dynamics.
II.3. Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010)
The model introduces banks to a traditional financial frictions model (Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)). Banks extend loans to finance firms working capital
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requirements and entrepreneurs longer-term investment projects. They fund these
loans by issuing transferable deposits, which pay households a nominal rate of inter-
est that is determined at the time the deposit is originated and is not contingent on
the shocks that intervene until maturity. This is because households are risk-averse.
Entrepreneurial loans are risky for banks because the returns on the underlying in-
vestments are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. A sufficiently unfavorable shock can
lead to the borrowers insolvency. The idiosyncratic shock is observed by the en-
trepreneur, but not by the bank, and the variance of the shock is the realization of
a time-varying process. Banks hedge against credit risk by charging a premium over
and above the risk-free rate at which they can borrow from savers, i.e. an external
finance premium (EFP). As in BGG, the EFP varies inversely with entrepreneurs
net worth, which also functions as a collateral and positively with the underlying
investment risk.
They find that the risk shock is responsible for a substantial portion of economic
fluctuations. Over the business cycle, this shock explains more than a third of the
volatility of investment in the Europe and 60 percent of that volatility in the US. At
lower frequencies, when the co-integration of financial variables and the real economy
is strongest, the contribution of the risk shock to variance in investment is 42 percent
for EU and 64 percent for the US. The contribution to variance in GDP is 35 percent
for EU and 47 percent for the US. The risk shock also explains the majority of the
stock market variance and gives a significant contribution to the long term interest
rate spread as well. Most of the economic effects of the financial shocks occur as
agents respond to news, about the future realization of these processes. These are
predominantly revisions of beliefs in the credit market about future investment risk
conditions.
II.4. Mendoza (2010)
The novelty of this model is that it introduces sudden stops in a small open economy
DSGE framework. Sudden stops refer to a non-linear phenomenon in the open
economy setting whereby a country suddenly looses access to international credit
markets. The idea of sudden stops (or temporary credit constraints) was first studied
by Calvo (1998). Three facts characterize sudden stops. These are: reversals in the
current account, deep recessions, and collapses in real asset prices and the price of
non-tradable goods relative to tradable.
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The basic mechanism of the model is as follows. In an economy where the
leverage ratio is endogenously determined and is at a high level (but not 100%
of the asset value), shocks to imported input prices, the world interest rate and
productivity trigger collateral constraints on debt and working capital. The binding
constraints on both the debt of households and on the working capital of firms (the
two constrained agents in this model) force them to fire sell their capital because of
high margin calls. They face an upward sloping supply of equity (because of Tobin’s
Q), and are therefore forced to reduce investment as a result of a reduced demand
for equity and higher discounting of future dividends. The price of equity will fall.
If the credit constraint was set as an exogenous fixed amount, these would be the
main adjustments. However with endogenously binding collateral constraint, this
fall in equity price will make force firms to reduce investment even further because
of more binding collateral constraints, so another round of margin calls takes place
and Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism is triggered. This has immediate effects on
output and factor demand since collapsing collateral values cut access to new capital.
Just as in the BGG (1999) framework, the binding collateral constraints induce
significant amplification in the responses of the real variables to the shock, but of
a larger magnitude than in the former model because of the constrained conditions
of households as well as the Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism. In addition to the
demand-side effects of sudden stops, there are also important supply-side ones such
as significant drops in imported inputs, and drops in capacity utilization. These two
effects is what this paper tries to capture.
However, the effects of the debt-deflation mechanism are non-monotonic, because
they are weaker at the extremes in which the SOE can collateralise all of its assets
or cannot borrow at all than in the cases in between. When agents cannot borrow
at all, the constraint does not respond to decreasing asset value (i.e. exogenous
collateral constraint) and so there is no debt-deflation mechanism. On the other
hand, when agents can collateralize all of its assets, there is no direct effect from
the collateral constraint on the equity premium (since equity prices do not fall).
Excluding uncertainty, full collateralization removes all subsequent distortions on
investment and the price of capital, and hence there is no debt-deflation mechanism
again. Consumption and debt still adjust, but they do so as they would with an
exogenous credit constraint.
In practice, sudden stops are not very frequent events because of precautionary
savings, which reduce the probability of a disruption in access to international capital
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markets. Nevertheless, a few downturns of this type have occurred, such as the
Mexico’s 1995 crisis, Thailand’s 1997 crises, Russia’s 1998 crisis or Brazil’s 1998-99
crisis.
II.5. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
This is also a model that introduces an explicit banking sector in a general equi-
librium framework, but apart from the traditional credit constraints on firms, it
introduces lending frictions in the interbank market. Just as in BGG (1999), finan-
cial intermediaries intermediate between lenders and borrowers, and monitor debtors
on behalf of creditors. However, the novelty lies in that in addition to the agency
problem between creditors and debtors, there is an agency problem between banks
and creditors that potentially constrains the ability of intermediaries to obtain funds
from either depositors (retail market), or other banks (wholesale market). When the
constraint is binding (or there is some chance it may bind) on the retail market, the
intermediary’s balance sheet limits its ability to obtain deposits. In this instance,
the constraint effectively introduces a wedge between the loan and deposit rates.
During a crisis, this spread widens substantially, which in turn sharply raises the
cost of credit that non-financial borrowers face.
For the interbank market, the dynamics is slightly different. To generate frictions
on the wholesale market, banks are subject to an idiosyncratic “liquidity” shock,
which have the effect of creating surplus and deficits of funds across financial in-
stitutions. If the interbank market works perfectly, then funds flow smoothly from
institutions with surplus funds to those in need. In this case, loan rates are thus
equalized across different financial institutions. Aggregate behavior in this instance
resembles the case of homogeneous intermediaries.
However, the same agency problem that limits banks to obtain funds from retail
markets can constrain banks to obtain funds on the wholesale one. If they are only
able to obtain funds from a limited set of financial intermediaries, disruptions of
interbank markets are possible and these can affect real activity. In this instance,
banks with deficit funds offer higher loan rates to non-financial firms than interme-
diaries with surplus funds. In a crisis, this gap widens leading to financial markets
becoming segmented and sclerotic. The inefficient allocation of funds across inter-
mediaries can further depress aggregate activity. Lastly, authors show how different
government credit policies can improve this mis-allocation of funds in the interbank
75
market.
II.6. Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011)
This is a small open-economy version of the financial accelerator model with labor
market frictions. Accordingly the model incorporate financial frictions in the ac-
cumulation and management of capital similar to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999, henceforth BGG) and Christiano et al. (2003, 2008). The asymmetry of
information between lenders and borrowers holds. The presence of asymmetric in-
formation in financing the capital stock leads to a role for the balance sheets of
entrepreneurs.
The debt contracts extended by banks to entrepreneurs are financed by issuing
liabilities to households. Different to BGG (1999), however, households are also
allowed to borrow foreign funds to deposit into banks. Because of households’ risk-
aversion, the interest rate that households receive is nominally non-state-contingent.
These nominal contracts give rise to wealth effects of unexpected changes in the
price level (inflation or deflation) of the sort emphasized by Fisher (1933). A similar
mechanism is set in motion whenever the price of capital changes as this affects the
asset side of entrepreneurs balance sheets.
Second, the authors include labor market search and matching framework of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005).Labor market
search and matching is integrated into the financial frictions environment with phys-
ical capital and monetary factors. A key feature of this model is that there are wage-
setting frictions a la Calvo, but they do not have a direct impact on ongoing worker
employer relations as long as these are mutually beneficial. However, wage-setting
frictions have an impact on the effort of an employer in recruiting new employees.
The financial and labor market frictions are integrated into a small open econ-
omy setting by incorporating the small open economy structure of Adolfson et al.
(2005, 2007, 2008). The foreign economy is modeled as a VAR in foreign inflation,
interest rate, output and two worldwide unit-root technology shocks, neutral and
investment-specific. The VAR specification allows for both an exogenous shock and
an endogenous risk-adjustment term that induce deviations from uncovered interest
parity (UIP). The international interaction consists of trade of goods as well as in
risk-less bonds. The three final goods consumption, investment and exports are
produced by combining the domestic homogenous good with specific imported in-
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puts for each type of final good. They allow for Calvo price rigidity both of imports
and exports and in that way allow for limited pass-through. Financial activity (bank
lending and monitoring of defaulting entrepreneurs) is, however, a purely domestic
activity.
II.7. Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Gertler and Karadi (2011) model is very similar to the previous one. Developed
at approximately the same time, the author capitalized on the insights from the
previous model in order to study more closely the stabilizing effects of unconventional
monetary policy on financial market disruptions.
Just as in the previous models, there are two agency problems. One is between
creditors and debtors, and the other is between banks and creditors. The second
agency problem introduces endogenous constraints on bank leverage ratios, which
have the effect of tying overall credit flows to the equity capital in the intermediary
sector. A deterioration of bank capital will lead to a rise in credit costs.
The difference with the previous framework is, however, that central banks can
lend directly to private credit markets. It acts as an intermediary by borrowing
funds from savers and then lending them to investors. Unlike private intermediaries,
the central bank is not credit constrained. There is no agency problem between
the central bank and its creditors because it can commit to always honoring the
government debt. Thus, in a period when private intermediation is disrupted, the
central bank can intervene to support credit flows. On the other hand, ceteris
paribus, central bank intermediation is less efficient than the private intermediation.
The introduction of this trade-off is crucial for the existence of both intermediation
types.
The business cycle framework developed by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets
and Wouters (2007) is used to study both the conventional interest rate policy, as
well as unconventional credit market interventions by the central bank.
II.8. Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011)
The model is a standard New-Keynesian one augmented to incorporate a heteroge-
neous financial sector that consists of two different types of banks. Their behavior is
the outcome of explicit optimization problems and they trade central bank reserves
amongst each other on the interbank market. The two banks are commercial banks,
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and investment banks and both have exclusive functions and operate in monopolisti-
cally competitive markets. Commercial banks accept deposits from households and
grant loans to entrepreneurs, i.e. the entrepreneur combines her net worth with a
commercial bank loan to purchase her capital stock employed in production. A bor-
rowing constraint is introduced in the borrower-lender relationship as in Iacoviello
(2005) and Gerali et al. (2009). However, in this model the financial friction arises
in the relationship between the commercial banks and the investment banks where
the commercial banks ability to obtain interbank liquidity is limited by the asset
portfolio she can offer as collateral. Investment banks, on the other hand, enter
repurchase agreements with the central banks, and subsequently sell them to com-
mercial banks on the interbank markets. Hence, they are the only banks in direct
contact with the central bank. This is a unique feature of this model. Another fea-
ture incorporated in the model is the distinction between the fundamental price of
capital, Q, equivalent to Tobin’s Q and the market price of capital, S, which consid-
ered by the commercial bank sector to assess the collateral value. This latter feature
is introduced in order to study whether central banks should explicitly respond to
asset prices movements.
The authors find that a financial sector helps to dampen monetary policy shocks
to the real economy. Moreover, they find that if an asset price bubble exists, and
the price including the bubble is used to assess the value of collateral, the financial
sector amplifies shocks to the real economy.
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Figure III.1: Long-term relations
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Figure III.2: Supply side decomposition of GDP growth
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Figure III.3: Real data
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Figure III.4: Real data 2
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Figure III.5: Real data 3
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Figure III.6: Real and Monetary data
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Figure III.7: Monetary and Firm data
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Figure III.8: Firm data
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Figure III.9: Firm and Household data
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Figure III.10: Household data
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Figure III.11: Household data 2
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Figure III.12: Household and Financial data
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Figure III.13: Financial and Government data
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Figure III.14: Government data
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Figure III.15: External sector and Financial price data
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Figure III.16: Financial price data
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Figure III.17: Financial price data 2
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Figure III.18: Financial price data 3
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